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Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate over whether or not a trademark is 
“property,” and what the appropriate boundaries of such a property right 
might be. Some scholars assert that rules and justifications developed to 
handle rights in real property are generally a poor fit for intellectual 
property regimes and for trademark protection in particular. Others 
respond that a unified theory of property should be able to account for 
both real and intellectual property. Neither approach fully recognizes 
that property regimes are multifaceted. A close look at the critical 
features of particular regimes can pay unexpected dividends. 
This Article reveals how the process of trademark acquisition 
resembles, in startling ways, acquiring title to real property through 
adverse possession. Both the trademark and adverse possession regimes 
base acquisition on the productive use of the property in question. This 
productive use must be sufficient to provide notice of the asserted 
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property right to the public and competing claimants. A properly 
functioning productive use regime is valuable because such a regime is 
more likely to encourage an efficient initial allocation of property rights 
while also providing fairness-based limits on the scope of property 
rights. Recognizing the productive use structure in both regimes 
provides several significant insights. First, the productive use structure 
highlights the importance of the commercial strength inquiry as a use-
based limitation on the scope of protection even for inherently 
distinctive marks. Second, the productive use structure also clarifies 
how and why rights in the trademark commons are more active and 
property-like than rights held in common over expired patents and 
copyrights. Third, comparing the regimes shows how adverse possession 
is, surprisingly, a more hard-edged or “crystalline” property regime 
than the relatively “muddy” trademark regime. Finally, this analysis 
inspires interventions for trademark and adverse possession law to bring 
them more in line with the productive use requirement, and to open 
space for public use and competition. 
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Introduction 
In longstanding tradition, American courts have analogized 
trademark protection to property rights developed at common law.1 
The question of whether they should do so has recently preoccupied 
the legal academy,2 part of a larger debate about whether it is proper 
to view intellectual property through a real property lens and whether 
comparing intellectual property regimes to real property regimes gets 
us anywhere. Mark Lemley has led the charge in arguing that 
intellectual property is sui generis, with unique characteristics that 
make it unnecessary to “turn to some broader area of legal theory to 
seek legitimacy.”3 Under this sui generis framework, it is useless to 
apply “inapposite economic analysis borrowed from the very different 
case of land” to intellectual property.4 Scholars like John Duffy, by 
contrast, argue that identifying a “unified theory of property—one 
broad enough to account for the similarities and differences among 
species of property as diverse as Blackacre and patents—promises to 
increase rather than to diminish our understanding of property and 
intellectual property.”5 Neither approach explicitly recognizes that 
 
1. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to 
adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property 
made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by 
all other persons, has long been recognized by the common law . . . . It 
is a property right for the violation of which damages may be recovered 
in an action at law . . . .”). 
2. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1042 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] 
(“Trademark law, which was once limited to protecting against consumer 
confusion, has increasingly taken on the character of a property right, 
with the result that trademark ‘owners’ now have the power to prevent 
various kinds of uses of their marks, regardless of whether consumers will 
be confused or search costs increased.”). But see Mark P. McKenna, The 
Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1839, 1848 (2007) (“American courts from the very beginning protected 
producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by recognizing 
property rights.”). 
3. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1075. 
4. Id. More specifically, Lemley has argued that if intellectual property is a 
coherent category, trademark protection falls outside it. Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
Yale L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Lanham Act] (“Even 
if one accepts [that patents and copyrights are analogous to real 
property], it does not carry over to trademarks. The justifications for 
trademark law are different from those for other forms of intellectual 
property.” (footnote omitted)). 
5. John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the 
Average Cost Thesis, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1077, 1078 (2005). Some see the 
comparison between intellectual property and real property as a means 
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real property regimes are multifaceted. Valuable results are more 
likely when we compare the “right” real property regime to the 
“right” intellectual property regime—when the regimes compared 
share not only similar structures but similar policy justifications. 
For example, one of the problems in analogizing trademark 
acquisition to rights in real property is that trademark acquisition, as 
it developed in the common law, is not a pure first-in-time regime. 
Instead, acquiring a trademark requires productive use of a given 
word, symbol, or other identifier as a trademark—a source signifier. 
Such use is generally not necessary to acquire rights in real property, 
with at least one important exception: adverse possession is also a 
regime with a productive use requirement.6 As this Article argues, the 
parallels between acquiring real property through adverse possession 
and acquiring rights to the exclusive use of trademarks are substantial 
and instructive: both doctrinal regimes manifest a purpose to provide 
notice to the public and competing claimants through productive use. 
 
to expand intellectual property protections, while others see it as 
providing a rationale for constraining them. Compare Lemley, Lanham 
Act, supra note 4, at 1697 (“Courts seem to be replacing the traditional 
rationale for trademark law with a conception of trademarks as property 
rights, in which trademark ‘owners’ are given strong rights over the 
marks without much regard for the social costs of such rights.”), with 
David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 Minn. 
L. Rev. 652, 657 (2010) (asserting that property rhetoric can “explicitly 
present public entitlements in information as a subject of [collective or 
public] ownership” to “provide[ ] needed pushback against the powerful 
but overly broad claims of rights in information that are commonly 
made” regarding copyright). 
6. A handful of cases and scholars have compared trademark ownership 
and adverse possession in three more limited ways. First, courts in the 
early part of the twentieth century compared the junior user’s laches 
defense—that the plaintiff “slept on his rights” for too long and now 
cannot enforce them—to an adverse possession defense against an 
ejectment claim. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing 
Co., 175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949). But see infra note 177 (discussing 
problems with the analogy between a junior user and an adverse 
possessor). Second, scholars have suggested in passing that the 
trademark owner takes a defensive posture against encroachment similar 
to that taken by a real property owner to forestall adverse possession. 
See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 1313, 1318 (2010) (describing trademark enforcement 
as “akin to thwarting adverse possession” in that the trademark “must be 
defended against any and all encroachments”). Finally, the acquisition of 
an incontestable registration, which can occur after five consecutive years 
of continuous use of a registered trademark, has been likened to adverse 
possession, due to its temporal component, but criticized as otherwise 
lacking. See, e.g., Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in 
Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 953, 982–85 (1986). While 
these comparisons are apt, they miss the larger picture. 
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This productive use is in turn notice providing,7 meaning generating,8 
boundary setting,9 abuse limiting,10 and value creating.11 
A productive use requirement is desirable in both regimes for 
three interlocking reasons. First, requiring productive use makes it 
more likely that the initial allotment of property rights is more 
efficient than other potential allocations.12 Second, productive use 
provides a fairness-based limitation on the scope of property rights, 
making sure both that the initial possessor has done something to 
merit the property right and allowing for necessary reallocation when 
the productive use of a subsequent claimant outstrips the productive 
use of the initial claimant.13 Third, productive use regimes are 
communicative and information forcing, delineating the boundaries of 
the property right at issue. Property seekers, competing claimants, 
and the public all receive notice from and provide notice to one 
another in regimes that require productive use.14 
Part I of this Article discusses the main similarities between the 
trademark and adverse possession regimes. Part I.D explains how the 
acquisition of rights in descriptive marks most clearly resembles adverse 
possession. Part II.A explains how the rights in inherently distinctive 
marks are also dependent on productive use. Part II.B clears up the 
hostility misnomer that has crept into claim of right analysis in adverse 
possession doctrine, while Part II.C explains how the comparison to 
adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement helps circumscribe the 
rights acquired by the trademark owner. Part III discusses the role 
played by productive public use in the creation and expiration of 
trademark rights. Part IV focuses on several critical differences between 
the regimes to highlight how adverse possession is, surprisingly, a more 
hard-edged or “crystalline” property regime—in the sense first used by 
Carol Rose15—than the relatively “muddy” trademark regime. 
Recognizing the central importance of productive use highlights how 
both regimes have gone strayed from their productive use foundations. 
Part V recommends interventions to bring them back in line. 
 
7. See infra Part I.  
8. See infra Parts II.A, III; notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 95–96, 135–136 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 235–237 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 216–24, 281–82, and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part IV.C; notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra Parts II.A, IV.A; notes 62–63, 76 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Parts I, III, V.A. 
15. Carol Rose labeled imprecise or fuzzy property regimes as “muddy,” 
compared with clearer “crystalline” property regimes. Carol M. Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 577–80 
(1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals]. 
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I. The Notice Function of Productive Use 
Adverse possession and the law protecting trademarks are 
property regimes that are more similar than one might at first 
imagine. At their core, trademark law and adverse possession are both 
communicative regimes, but that communication with the public, 
competitors, and other potential claimants is carried out via productive 
use of the property at issue. Bringing the property to productive use is 
valuable because the use itself provides an indication of the 
boundaries of the property, and simultaneously requires some 
evidence that the claimant has acted openly, as an owner should.  
For example, the adverse possessor who operates under color of 
title or puts a fence around the property provides information about 
how she values the property and indicates that she has gone to some 
length in signaling that interest to the record owner and other 
competitors for the property. Initial steps like fencing lead to a 
transfer of title, however, only when the adverse possessor also 
engages in continuous and exclusive use over time.16 She must act like 
an owner, and persistently doing so leads the public to treat her like 
one. Adverse possession is also information forcing.17 By entering the 
property and subjecting it to use, the adverse possessor puts the 
record owner on notice that there are competing claims to the 
property, and the record owner should step in to clarify the 
boundaries of the property, or risk losing her claim. 
Like adverse possession, trademark use is also communicative and 
information forcing. Consumers come to understand the scope of the 
mark owner’s claim as the mark is used in commerce to designate 
goods and services from a consistent source. Competitors are also 
notified of the trademark owner’s claim through her productive use.18 
This Part describes these similarities in more detail. Part I.A 
briefly describes the trademark and adverse possession regimes. Part 
I.B compares aspects of the trademark and adverse possession regimes 
that require actual, open, and notorious possession from the respective 
claimants and summarizes the traditional justifications for trademark 
ownership and adverse possession in light of the productive use 
requirement. Part I.C describes how trademark registration acts like 
 
16. See infra Part I.C. 
17. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 73, 78–79 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, Possession] (discussing how 
possession of property requires communication by the original claimant 
to others who may be interested in the property, lest he lose it to those 
individuals through adverse possession); see also Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 57 (2002) 
(noting the desirable effects of information forcing with the “dual 
functions of ‘quieting titles’ and facilitating transactions”). 
18. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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color of title or fencing the property—incentivizing activity that 
enhances notice to the public without stripping the productive use 
requirement. Part I.D analyzes in detail the similarities between the 
continuous use requirement in adverse possession and the acquired 
distinctiveness requirement in trademark law. 
A. The Basics of Adverse Possession and Trademark Acquisition 
As a matter of black letter law, there are five elements of a 
successful adverse possession claim, and each element manifests an 
aspect of the notice function of productive use. First, there must be 
actual entry.19 The adverse possessor can generally claim only so much 
land as was possessed and converted to use.20 Second, the use must be 
notorious—something the reasonably attentive landowner would 
notice if she were paying attention.21 Third, the adverse possessor 
must engage in exclusive possession of the property.22 Fourth, that 
possession must be under claim of right, or in other words, without 
permission.23 Fifth and finally, each state prescribes by statute the 
amount of time for which the adverse possessor must continuously 
possess the property, without ejectment, in order to secure title.24 If the 
adverse possessor successfully engages in exclusive use of the property 
for the statutory period, she can quiet title, or in the alternative, 
prevail against an action for ejectment by the title owner.25 
Trademark acquisition also hinges on notice-providing productive 
use. The right to use a trademark exclusively is obtained, under the 
U.S. system, but not through mere initial adoption.26 Instead, the 
 
19. See infra Part I.B. 
20. Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property § 4.2.1, at 146 
(2d ed. 2005). 
21. 8 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § P6.08[3][c] 
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2012) (stating, as a matter of public policy, “the 
owner should not lose his or her land without some reasonable warning that 
should have made the owner aware that adverse possession was occurring”). 
22. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
23. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
24. For example, California has a five-year statutory window, Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code §§ 321, 322 (West 2006), while Iowa requires continuous 
possession for forty years. Iowa Code § 614.31 (2013). This Article 
primarily compares U.S. trademark law with the adverse possession 
regimes in the various states. 
25. R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Response to Professor 
Cunningham, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 65, 67 n.6 (1986) (“[T]he requirements 
for gaining title by adverse possession do not vary according to the form 
of [the] action.”). 
26. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he exclusive right to [a 
trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”).  
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trademark owner establishes her rights through the use of a given 
word or symbol to designate a source for goods or services.27 This 
productive use infuses the mark with communicative value.28 
Trademarks are often grouped into categories, based on the initial 
suitability of the word or symbol chosen for trademark protection. 
Some words are seen as inherently distinctive—inherently capable of 
carrying trademark meaning—because the word chosen is not directly 
related to the product or service offered for sale. For inherently 
distinctive marks—like XEROX, a fanciful mark for photocopiers, 
APPLE, an arbitrary mark for computers, and GLEEM, a suggestive 
mark for toothpaste—federal trademark protection is granted 
automatically upon “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”29 
Other words are more descriptive of the product. For these 
descriptive terms, initial use of a descriptive mark—like SEALTIGHT 
for self-sealing fasteners—secures no priority over other users of 
identical or similar marks until the descriptive term acquires 
distinctiveness.30 Descriptive terms do not initially signal source, so 
significance to consumers, “secondary meaning” or “acquired 
distinctiveness,” must be developed.31 For example, a term like 
TASTY for apples describes a characteristic of the goods sold, and is 
 
27. Any given word or symbol can have many meanings. Linguists refer to a 
particular meaning of a word as a lexeme. One string of letters (or 
sounds), like “delta,” can have multiple meanings: the fourth letter of 
the Greek alphabet; the triangle-shaped “tract of alluvial land enclosed 
and traversed by the diverging mouths of the Nile”; or an arrangement 
of three electrical windings. 4 Oxford English Dictionary 426 (2d 
ed. 1989). Each meaning is a lexeme. Different trademarks can be 
derived from the same string of letters or sounds, like “DELTA,” for 
airlines; faucets; or fine writing instruments. Thus, the use of a 
preexisting word or symbol as a mark creates a new meaning for that 
word or symbol in its use as a mark. Each use of a word or symbol as a 
mark to signify goods or services from a particular source creates a new 
“trademark lexeme.” See infra Part II.C. 
28. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: 
The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. 
Rev. 325, 345 (1980). 
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “use in commerce”). See also 2 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 16:8 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that the definition of “use” 
was changed to “require a greater degree of activity”). The provisions 
codifying federal trademark protection are commonly known as the 
Lanham Act. 
30. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Co. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 795, 
803 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing the importance that a trademark is 
“truly distinctive” to support a cause of action). 
31. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 15:10 (noting the use of “ ‘acquired 
distinctiveness’ as a synonym for secondary meaning”).  
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thus merely descriptive and unprotectable until the TASTY mark 
acquires secondary meaning, that is, until consumers come to 
interpret the mark as a designation of the source of the apples sold 
under the mark.32 
Productive use of a descriptive mark builds secondary meaning, 
but productive use is required to develop commercial strength in any 
mark.33 Thus, even an inherently distinctive mark must be consistently 
and continually used in commerce or the mark may be deemed 
effectively unenforceable, if not outright abandoned.34 A failure to use 
the mark in commerce will result in the mark falling into the public 
domain for subsequent appropriation by another for trademark use.35 
Some terms can never be protected as trademarks. A term that a 
court concludes is ex ante generic for the genus of goods or services, 
like COMPUTER for computers, may never be transformed into a 
trademark, even if consumers should come to associate the generic 
terms with a particular good or service from a particular source.36 
 
32. Professor McCarthy divides marks into those business symbols that are 
inherently distinctive and those that are not. He refers to the latter category 
as “secondary meaning marks.” See, e.g., id. § 16:34. As this Article 
describes in more detail in Part II.A, there is little real difference between 
the commercial strength required to enforce even inherently distinctive 
marks and the secondary meaning required to show a descriptive term has 
become enforceable. Thus, while the term “descriptive mark” is something 
of a misnomer, this Article uses it as a placeholder for “secondary meaning 
mark” or the more accurate but fatally unwieldy “descriptive term that has 
acquired distinctiveness.” 
33. See infra Part II.A. But see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning 
Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 182–83 (2010) (criticizing natural rights 
theories for basing trademark rights on productive use as divorced from the 
market in which the owner offers goods under the mark). 
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “abandonment”); Exxon Corp. v. 
Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 1983) (discussing 
the requirement of continued use of a mark under the Lanham Act to 
“avoid a finding of abandonment”); 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 16:9 
(“Prior and continuous usage is required.”). 
35. Professor McCarthy describes the public domain as follows: 
“ ‘[P]ublic domain’ is the status of an invention, creative work, 
commercial symbol, or any other creation that is not protected by any 
form of intellectual property. Public domain is the rule: intellectual 
property is the exception.” 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 1.2 (quoting 
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy’s Desk Encyclopedia of 
Intellectual Property 354 (2d. ed. 1995)). 
36. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (holding that generic terms “cannot [be] transform[ed] . . . 
into a subject for trademark”); see also infra Part IV.A. In addition, a 
source-signifying mark can become generic ex post if its primary 
significance to the public shifts to indicate the genus of goods or 
services, rather than signifying a source of particular goods or services. 
See infra Part III. 
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A trademark owner may successfully enjoin the use of the mark 
by a junior user, where the owner can establish the new use is likely 
to confuse consumers. Injunctive relief is common; damages are less 
so.37 And while use in commerce is the means to acquire rights in a 
trademark, the scope of what is protected is determined only in 
comparison to the use engaged in by others. The scope of protection is 
often fully defined only in litigating the question of likelihood of 
confusion, where courts apply a “muddy” multifactor test.38 
There are three key commonalities in the trademark acquisition 
and adverse possession regimes. First, both regimes require the 
acquiring property owner to engage in productive use of the property 
at issue. Second, in both regimes, that productive use fulfills a notice 
function that informs record owners, competitors, and the public 
about the scope of the asserted claim. Third, both regimes are 
concerned with the relative or comparative value of asserted rights. 
While trademark acquisition looks like a first-in-time property regime, 
the mark owner must establish rights against other comers via use in 
commerce.39 Being first to adopt a mark is not enough.40 With the 
exception of fanciful marks, every trademark is drawn from words or 
symbols with preexistent meaning, to which the public and com-
petitors have varying claims.41 And while adverse possession is a 
means of property reallocation, there are important similarities 
between the requirements an adverse possessor must meet to acquire 
property from a title owner and the productive labor that justifies 
property ownership.42 Like the trademark owner, the adverse 
 
37. For example, while damages for past infringement are waived where the 
defendant raises a successful laches defense, injunctive relief will only be 
barred if the plaintiff is guilty of “gross laches.” Univ. of Pittsburgh v. 
Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044–45 (3d Cir. 1982). A junior 
user who engages in the productive use necessary to develop trademark 
rights can thus earn immunity to a future claim by senior user if the use 
is tolerated for too long. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co., 
175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949). Nevertheless, the junior trademark user 
cannot entirely deprive the senior user of her rights in the mark, no 
matter the relative value of their respective uses. See also infra note 177. 
38. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 Colum. J.L. & 
Arts 571, 574–75 (2008) (presenting the multifactor likelihood-of-
confusion test used to determine trademark infringement as an exemplar 
of the typical difficulty of determining which if any factors are 
dispositive and how they should be weighed). 
39. See infra Parts I.D, II.A. 
40. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“[T]he exclusive right to 
[a trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”). 
41. See infra Part III. 
42. See generally Eric R. Claeys, Locke Unlocked: Productive Use in 
Trespass, Adverse Possession, and Labor Theory 53 (George Mason 
Univ. Law. & Econ. Research. Paper Series, Paper No. 12-21, 2012), 
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possessor must signal her claim not only to the title owner, but to 
the entire world.43 
The similarities between the adverse possession and trademark 
acquisition regimes are most apparent when comparing adverse 
possession’s requirements of actual entry, open and notorious 
possession, and continuous use with similar requirements in trademark 
law. As developed in the next two subparts, these similarities 
highlight how both regimes base the acquisition of property rights on 
productive use that communicates the property claim to the public 
and potential competitors. 
B. The Notice Function of Open and Notorious Possession 
In order to claim real property through adverse possession, there 
must be actual entry, that is to say, “the possessor must physically 
occupy the premises in some manner.”44 Adverse possession must not 
only be actual, but also open and notorious. Such use provides notice 
to the record owner sufficient to ascertain whether she values the 
property as much as the possessor does.45 Failing to notice open and 
notorious adverse possession is a signal that the record owner holds 
the property in somewhat lower esteem than the possessor, or at least 
that her need for it is less immediate. Generally, courts look to the 
typical use to which property of that type is put.46 Where the adverse 
possessor occupies part of a pre-existing parcel, she will generally 
prevail in claiming title only to the part of the parcel where 
productive use takes place.47 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759551 (noting that productive 
labor theory conditions property ownership on “a responsibility to 
‘enjoy’ ” and make use of the property). 
43. See Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851) (“[C]olor of title 
. . . has always been received as evidence that the person in possession 
claims for himself, and of course, adversely to all the world.”). 
44. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.1, at 145. 
45. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws 129 (2010) (noting that, in adverse possession, the law infers 
that “the lawbreaker places a higher value on property than its true 
owner does”); Rose, Possession, supra note 17, at 80–81 (noting that the 
burden of correcting the misapprehension of the adverse possessor falls 
on the actual owner). 
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1989) (in banc) 
(“[A]ctual occupancy means the ordinary use to which the land is 
capable and such as an owner would make of it.” (quoting Anderson v. 
Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc., 458 P.2d 756, 759 (Colo. 1969))). 
47. Crowley v. Whitesell, 702 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) 
(typically, adverse possessors “must prove actual possession of the 
entire tract”). 
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Adverse possession of real property is typically justified on one of 
three interlocking grounds: settling claims,48 the demerit of the title 
owner,49 and the merit of the adverse possessor.50 While the claim-
settling justification operates like a statute of limitations to bring 
finality to property disputes, the demerit and merit rationales seek to 
justify the actual transfer of title from the record owner to the 
adverse possessor. The merit rationale has historically been seen as 
the weakest of the three justifications for adverse possession,51 but 
recognizing the notice function of productive use at the core of 
adverse possession reaffirms the importance of the merit rationale. 
The English common law discounted the merit of the adverse 
possessor,52 but it cannot be the case that the demerit of the property 
owner is sufficient justification for the transfer of title. If the law merely 
sought to dispossess inattentive record owners, an abandonment regime 
would work just as well.53 Such a regime could properly consider the 
evidence that the record owner failed to secure the property or 
otherwise put it to reasonably productive use in the community. 
 
48. Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 
135, 135 (1918) (arguing that adverse possession has no goal of 
rewarding the diligent trespasser or penalizing the sleeping owner but 
that “the great purpose” is simply to quiet title, prove meritorious titles, 
and correct conveyancing errors). 
49. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” 
Adverse Possession, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1059 (2006) (noting that 
a purpose of adverse possession is to prod “the sleeping owner” or 
reward “the productive possessor”); Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (noting 
that “demerit” asks whether the owner is disentitled because his moral 
interest expires, or because others divest his continuing claim). 
50. See Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (suggesting that Locke’s property 
theory is best described as a theory of property rights secured through 
productive labor). Admittedly, this productive use can be met in part 
by delineating boundaries in a way that discloses their existence to 
others who might be interested in the property. See Rose, Possession, 
supra note 17, at 88.  
51. Thomas Merrill, for example, criticizes what he sees as the four major 
permutations of the reliance-based merit rationale—preserving the 
peace, honoring the adverse possessor’s personal attachment to property 
as part of her identity, a sunk-cost or quasi-rents rationale grounded in 
forestalling ambush and holdout by the record owner, and reliance of 
the public on the adverse possessor’s apparent ownership—because none 
of them actually justify transferring the property to the adverse 
possessor. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1122, 1131–32 (1985). 
52. Ballantine, supra note 48, at 135.  
53. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
355, 415–19 (2010) (arguing that it is nearly impossible to reason why 
bad-faith adverse possession should be permitted while abandonment of 
real property is prohibited). 
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Where the demerit of the record owner was significant, the property 
would fall back to the public domain to be claimed again via auction, 
capture, or some other possessory act. An auction of this sort can be 
wasteful, however, as potential claimants hoping to win the race will 
be willing to expend resources up to their best estimation of the value 
of the property, resulting in a total expenditure of resources greater 
than the value of the property in the hands of any potential victorious 
claimant.54 Adverse possession avoids the inefficient race to claim the 
abandoned property by weighing the record owner’s demerit against 
the possessor’s merit and making the transfer only where the relative 
weight justifies the shift. 
The requirements that possession be actual, open, and continuous 
are arguably grounded in the desire to provide the record owner with 
sufficient notice of the threat to her property right. Thus, only the 
truly disinterested or inattentive property owner loses title, which 
helps the public discern which record owners might “demerit”—or 
deserve to lose—the property.55 The merit rationale has been seen 
alternately as grounded in the psychological attachment of the 
adverse possessor to the property,56 or in the labor performed in 
 
54. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep. 267, 280 (1988) (arguing that a 
use-driven first possession regime minimizes rent-seeking, and comparing 
the U.S. system favorably to the Japanese system, where the pure 
registration system permits the “banking” of trademarks); see also 
Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A 
Domain Name Case Study, 74 Ind. L.J. 587, 607 (1999) (describing the 
domain name allocation system as an inefficient “pure registration 
system” that “gives rise to wasteful ‘rent seeking’ and ‘gold rushes,’ as 
parties compete to lock up potentially valuable domain names, without 
any thought of productive use”). This Article contrasts the trademark 
and domain-name regimes in more detail in Part IV.C. 
55. Of course, even unproductive squatting could provide notice to the 
owner that someone hoped to obtain possession over the land. Larissa 
Katz notes, however, that under the inconsistent use test applied in 
Canadian law, only the possessor who puts the property to different use 
than the owner can secure through adverse possession. Larissa Katz, 
The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution 
in Property Law, 55 McGill L.J. 47, 65 (2010). 
56. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 Duke L.J. 1, 54 n.224 (2004) (“Adverse 
possession, for example, reflects not only a utilitarian conception of 
robust land development but also personhood and labor theories: an 
adverse possessor identifies more directly with the land than does its 
absentee owner (personhood) and has a Lockean claim based on 
development of the land (labor).”); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have enjoyed 
and used as your own for a long time . . . takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to 
defend yourself, however you came by it.”). 
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exercising exclusive control over the property,57 but neither version of 
the attachment or labor the rationale fully realize the social value 
provided by the adverse possessor. 
While the adverse possession factors are traditionally understood 
to inquire whether the adverse possessor provides a sufficiently clear 
signal about her claim to the inattentive record owner, successful 
adverse possession also provides an important signal to the public. 
Carol Rose argues that possession is communicative, a “statement” 
providing “notice to the world through a clear act.”58 Thus, some of 
the value of adverse possession stems from its ability to communicate 
a claim of right to the public. Proper or “suitable” use—the type of 
use typical of an owner—provides notice to the public that the user 
wishes to interact with society as an owner.59 Rose posits that the 
transfer of property is justified on notice grounds when the record 
owner fails to eject or locate the adverse possessor. The record owner 
“fails to correct misleading appearances” while the adverse possessor 
“speaks loudly and clearly.”60 The information-forcing role played by 
the adverse possessor can lower transaction costs because it allows the 
public to “rely upon their own reasonable perceptions.”61 
Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal suggest that adverse 
possession is justified precisely because the adverse possessor’s 
willingness to possess the property, in the face of possible dispossession 
 
57. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 305–09 (Peter 
Laslett ed., 2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690) (explaining that 
one’s labor undertaken to annex and exclude others from the common 
state of nature and the appropriation one makes to himself results in a 
claim to property); Carrier, supra note 56, at 54 n.224 (noting that 
adverse possession reflects notions of land development and labor 
theories); Claeys, supra note 42, at 53 (noting that productive labor 
theory conditions property ownership on a responsibility to make use of 
the land). 
58. Rose, Possession, supra note 17, at 77. 
59. Id. at 78. 
60. Id. at 80. 
61. Id.; see also id. at 79 (“[Adverse possession] might be designed . . . to 
require the owner to assert her right publicly. It requires her to make it 
clear that she, and not the trespasser, is the person to deal with if 
anyone should wish to buy the property or use some portion of it.”). 
Thus, while the use required of an adverse possessor is merely use 
consistent with the character of the property and its location, 
Strahilevitz, supra note 53, at 417, the use is important because of its 
relative value, compared to the use of the record owner. Likewise, Rose 
reads the famous fox capture case, Pierson v. Post, as an instance where 
possession itself is a communicative “clear act.” Rose, Possession, supra 
note 17, at 77 (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)). 
Rose sees in Pierson a merger of Lockean labor and Blackstonian first 
entry. The capturing owner both adds value to or mixes labor with the 
captured property and signals to the public its claim to the property. Id. 
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before the end of the statutory period—as well as criminal and civil 
sanctions for trespass—signals that she highly values the property.62 
On the other hand, the record owner’s failure to take action against 
the adverse possessor within the statutory period signals the low value 
she places on the property.63 
Thus, adverse possession signals the comparative value that 
record owner and adverse possessor place on the property. Because 
the record owner has some trappings of notice, the record owner 
retains title merely by policing her boundaries and challenging 
encroachers. This is sufficient to send a clear signal of the property’s 
value. The adverse possessor must do more, engaging in some level of 
perceptible productive use not required by a record owner. This use 
signals to the public not only that the adverse possessor values the 
property, but that society should value the use to which the adverse 
possessor puts the property, or in the alternative, value the adverse 
possessor as a transaction party with regard to said property. 
The productive use requirement in trademark law serves similar 
functions, and stems from similar policy concerns. Consistent with the 
common law origins of trademark protection, trademark rights can be 
secured without any registration whatsoever and enforced as a matter 
of federal law.64 The productive use of the trademark in commerce 
defines the scope of the mark owner’s property right and provides a 
notice function similar to that provided by open and notorious use 
requirement in adverse possession.65 As Judge Easterbrook noted in 
 
62. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 45, at 128–29 (citing Fennell, supra 
note 49, at 1040); see also Claeys, supra note 42, at 54 (noting that in 
the adverse possession context, under the Lockean labor theory, “[t]he 
encroacher’s long occupancy is a simple and reliable proxy for her future 
productive use—just as a first-possessor’s occupancy is in relation to 
[previously] unowned land”). 
63. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 45, at 129. Peñalver & Katyal go on 
to argue that the law should also allow a high-value possessor to secure 
property where there is evidence of that high valuation and an absence 
of evidence about the owner’s valuation. Id. Claeys concurs from a 
Lockean perspective, noting that the silence of the record owner 
“provides objective proof that his interest in the land is not really that 
strong.” Claeys, supra note 42, at 55. 
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (setting forth a right of civil action for 
false designations of origin and false or misleading representations and 
descriptions).  
65. See Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that nationwide rights to a trademark are based on market 
saturation capable of putting other producers on notice of the mark’s 
use); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 18 
cmt. a (1995) (“Actual use by the claimant also furnishes public notice 
of the user’s potential rights in the designation.”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark 
Law, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1597, 1612 n.63 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & 
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the case of Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., “Only active use allows 
consumers to associate a mark with particular goods and notifies 
other firms that the mark is so associated.”66 The obligation to use 
the mark in commerce is, in part, a requirement that the trademark 
owner’s attempted possession occur with sufficient visibility to put 
both potential competitors and the public on notice. Goods need not 
be offered for sale initially, so long as analogous use, like pre-sales 
publicity, is open and notorious,67 that is, sufficient to “popularize 
[the mark] in the public mind,”68 and followed by bona fide use.69 
Thus, a mark owner’s property right is recognized only when she can 
establish use sufficient to secure secondary meaning or commercial 
strength. Without such a showing, she cannot enforce her rights 
against an alleged infringing user. 
The dominant justification for trademark rights has been an 
economic rationale: trademark protection is arguably designed to 
reduce consumer search costs and provide an incentive to the mark 
owner to provide goods and services of consistent quality, by allowing 
the mark owner to protect the mark as a unique signifier of that 
quality.70 In addition to lowering search costs, trademark protection 
serves a correlative function of protecting the public from deceit or 
fraud by providing a remedy against confusing misappropriation of 
trademarks.71 Mark owners are incentivized to maintain a consistent 
 
Janis, Contextualism] (noting that the use requirement serves a public 
notice function); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Use, Intent to 
Use and Registration in the USA, in Trade Mark Use 313, 315 
(Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005) (noting that the use 
requirement serves as a mechanism to put the public on notice). 
66. L’Oréal, 979 F.2d at 503.  
67. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Knoll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 628, 631 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“To acquire trademark rights there 
has to be an ‘open’ use, that is to say, a use has to be made to the 
relevant class of purchasers or prospective purchasers . . . .”). 
68. Am. Express Co. v. Goetz, 515 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam) (quoting Hous. & Servs., Inc. v. Minton, No. 97 Civ. 
2725(SHS), 1997 WL 349949, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997)). 
69. See SODIMA v. Int’l Yogurt Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 839, 853 (D. Or. 
1987) (“[P]riority need not depend solely on who gets to the consumer 
first, as long as there is bona fide shipment or activity . . . .”). 
70. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. 
Rev. 621, 623–24 (2004). But see Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer 
Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 67, 72 
(2012) (arguing that the search costs theory “distorts trademark law 
because neither confusion nor search costs are the right focus”). 
71. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 
40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927) (arguing that trademark protection 
“originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the grievous deceit of the 
people’ ”). 
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quality of goods in part because they can rely on trademark law to 
help remedy some attempts to free ride on the goodwill that stems 
from providing desirable goods of a constant quality.72 As a by-
product, trademark protection also protects producer investment in 
developing source signification in the mark.73  
There are other rationales for trademark protection and each one 
manifests some recognition of the importance of productive use as a 
justification for trademark rights or the importance of notice in the 
trademark system. The unfair competition rationale, for example, has 
been described as embracing two complementary functions: protecting 
business goodwill and protecting consumer recognition.74 The de-
velopment of business goodwill happens through the mark owner’s 
productive use, and this use puts the public on notice of the goods or 
services offered by the owner under that mark. 
Other rationales, like the unjust enrichment or anti-free-riding 
rationale,75 and the Lockean labor rationale,76 have been criticized 
because they are too property-like and reward the labor of mark 
creation instead of mark use.77 In addition, the unjust-enrichment 
 
72. See Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., 
Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[T]rademarks . . . encourage 
higher quality production by discouraging free-riders.”). It may be more 
correct to say that trademarks encourage consistency in quality. One is, 
for example, less interested in improvement at the local McDonald’s 
than the fungibility of the McDonald’s experience. 
73. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) 
(upholding registration of a trademark consisting only of a color); Eric 
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory 
L.J. 507, 552 (2005) (proposing that one purpose of trademark law is to 
protect “producers’ investment in quality that creates consumer goodwill 
towards them”). 
74. See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back 
Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371, 422 (2003) (describing the shift in 
trademark law from an integrated property theory to a bundle or 
exclusion theory, which “served the social goals of unfair competition 
law”). 
75. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va. 
L. Rev. 2099, 2111 (2004) (“ ‘[U]njust enrichment,’ focuses on sellers 
rather than consumers. It supposes that a seller is unjustly enriched when 
it appropriates to its own advantage the ‘goodwill’ that another seller has 
developed in its mark.” (footnote omitted)). 
76. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property 
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 n.64 (1992) 
(“In my view, ‘Lockean theory’ is largely the label courts use for their 
conviction that it is unfair for one person to take the fruits of another’s 
labor. . . . [But] Locke’s own approach, properly understood, leads to far 
fewer intellectual property rights than has been imagined.”). 
77. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private 
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain (pt. 2), 18 Colum.-VLA 
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rationale has been challenged on the ground that it mistakenly 
maximizes the interest of the mark owner instead of the interests of 
the purchasing public, and this comes at the expense of competition.78 
Nevertheless, underlying both the unjust enrichment and Lockean 
rationales is the notion that the mark is protected because, by using 
the mark in commerce, the mark owner has engaged in the production 
of meaning, valuable to the public and competitors. To the extent 
that those doctrines are used to justify problematic shifts in 
trademark law, the error is not in rewarding productive use but in 
granting trademark rights without requiring productive use, or 
providing levels of protection that are too broad. 
Consumer-focused rationales, like consumer protection79 and 
consumer autonomy,80 are more engaged with the notice side of the 
productive use equation. Marks are protected both because the 
protection keeps unscrupulous competitors from duping consumers,81 
and because it preserves the ability of consumers to differentiate 
between competitors’ goods and services.82 Protection of trademark 
 
J.L. & Arts 191, 240–41 (1994) (describing the opposing arguments for 
compensating mark creation for the surplus value placed on the mark in 
excess of the attached good in commerce). 
78. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the 
Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 163 (2005) 
(arguing that the unjust enrichment rationale must be limited in the 
trademark context by “traditional notions of fair competition”). 
79. See Bone, supra note 75, at 2108 (“The clearest moral principle relevant 
to trademark law is the moral norm against intentional deception or 
lying.”). Nevertheless, there is some overlap between protecting the 
intangible value associated with the mark and “protecting the buying 
public from some of the more unscrupulous members of our economic 
community.” Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 
F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968). 
80. See Dinwoodie & Janis, Contextualism, supra note 65, at 1625 (2007) 
(arguing that “preserving real consumer choice and enhancing consumer 
autonomy” is an instrumental role for trademark protection that reaches 
beyond economic efficiency rationales). Robert Bone, however, critiques 
the consumer autonomy rationale as “not only impossible to satisfy but 
also . . . in hopeless conflict with other rights.” Bone, supra note 75, at 
2110 n.31. See also McKenna, supra note 70 (arguing for a greater focus 
on consumer decision making in trademark law over the search costs 
theory currently accepted by courts). 
81. See Mossoff, supra note 74, at 419 (“[T]he fundamental principles of 
trademark law have essentially been ones of tort: the tort of 
misappropriation of the goodwill of the trademark owner, and the tort of 
deception of the consumer. In this sense, trademarks may not be 
thought of as analogous to ‘property rights’ at all.” (quoting Robert P. 
Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New 
Technological Age 559 (2d ed. 2000))). 
82. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 24:16 (“The consumer is entitled to 
be told the truth about the origin or sponsorship of products. . . . If the 
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rights can serve these consumer-focused functions even though marks 
do not convey perfect information. It must be noted, however, that 
consumers contribute to the creation of the property right as they 
come to use the mark as an indication of the mark owner’s goods and 
services.83 Some public uses can also pose a threat to those rights. 
Both dynamics are discussed in more detail in Part III. 
C. The Notice Functions of Fencing, Color of Title,  
and Trademark Registration 
For the aspiring property owner, even relatively limited 
productive use can secure property rights, when accompanying other 
notice-providing indicia. For example, fencing a parcel of property is 
usually treated as actual possession of the entire fenced portion,84 
sufficiently open and notorious to put the public and the record owner 
on notice of the claim, even if productive activity takes place only on 
a part of the parcel.85 Likewise, taking the property under color of title 
is usually sufficient to establish use of the entire parcel designated in 
the faulty title, so long as the adverse possessor actually uses part of 
the property.86 In some jurisdictions, the statutory period of exclusive 
possession required to secure title by adverse possession is shorter 
when the possession occurs under color of title.87 In other 
 
consumer is reasonably mistaken as to the source or sponsorship of an 
alleged infringer’s goods, she suffers a real and independent injury to her 
rights regardless of whether or not she is economically injured by the 
poor quality of the infringer’s goods or services.”). 
83. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 88 
N.C. L. Rev. 427, 449–67 (2010) (noting the important role consumers 
play in determining which brands succeed in a world where eight out of 
ten brands fail); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public 
Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999) 
(arguing that consumers impart trade symbols with intrinsic value). 
84. See Whittemore v. Amator, 713 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Ariz. 1986) (en 
banc) (maintaining a fence was sufficient to establish dominion over 
an entire parcel of land despite only actually using a smaller portion 
for livestock grazing). 
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 1990) (encircling the 
property within a wall was sufficiently open and notorious). 
86. See DeShon v. St. Joseph Country Club, 755 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (“Color of title . . . serves to extend actual possession of 
some portion of the land claimed to constructive possession of the whole 
tract described in the instrument providing basis for color of title.”); see 
also Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851) (“[C]olor of 
title, even under a void and worthless deed, has always been received as 
evidence that the person in possession claims for himself, and of course, 
adversely to all the world.”). 
87. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 893.25–.27 (2012) (requiring twenty years if 
adverse possessor actually occupied property under claim of right and 
either enclosed or improved it, ten years if adverse possessor recorded 
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jurisdictions, the adverse possession statute expressly excludes a 
transfer of property unless the possession occurs under color of title.88 
When an encroacher seeks to adversely possess real property, 
indications of notice like fencing or possessing under color of title will 
broaden the reach of the productive use. Thus, use of any portion of a 
fenced parcel amounts to constructive possession of the entire parcel.89 
Without actual possession, however, holding a flawed document that 
provides the color of title cannot by itself convey title to the property. 
For the trademark owner, registration also resembles color of title: 
registration alone secures no rights.90 Federal registration provides a 
mechanism to assert rights in a trademark, but provides only prima 
facie evidence that the registrant has used the mark in commerce.91 
While a trademark owner can file an application based on a bona fide 
intent to use a trademark in commerce, and that “ITU” application 
can give priority over a subsequent user, the applicant’s rights do not 
vest until the mark is actually used in commerce.92 Every registrant 
also has an obligation to provide continuing evidence of use, or the 
registration will be cancelled.93 Thus, like possessing property under 
 
color of title, and seven years if adverse possessor recorded color of title 
and paid taxes). 
88. See, e.g., Act 776, 1995 Ark. Acts 3370 (establishing additional require-
ments for adverse possession). 
89. Whittemore, 713 P.2d at 1233. 
90. Am. Express Co. v. Goetz 515 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]here 
can be no trademark absent goods sold and no service mark without 
services rendered.”). 
91. Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992). The 
court in L’Oréal goes on to suggest that “[l]iberality in registering marks 
is not problematic, because the registration gives notice to latecomers, 
which token use alone does not. Firms need only search the register 
before embarking on development.” Id. at 504. 
92. See WarnerVision Entm’t Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 
260 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that registration may be granted only after 
an ITU applicant files a statement of commercial use); Zirco Corp. v. 
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1542, 1544 (T.T.A.B. 1991) 
(“[T]he constructive use provision was intended . . . to give an intent-to-
use applicant a superior right over anyone adopting a mark after 
applicant’s filing date (providing the applicant’s mark is ultimately used 
and registered) . . . .”). 
93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2006) (establishing the requirements and 
duration of registration and the process for renewal); Torres v. Cantine 
Torresella S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 49 (Fed Cir. 1986) (affirming cancellation 
of a mark where the application for renewal fraudulently stated the 
mark was used on wine, vermouth, and champagne, when, in reality, a 
modified mark was used only on wine). 
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color of title, those rights conferred through trademark registration 
are contingent on actual use.94 
In both regimes, productive use defines the scope of the right, but 
plus factors—like color of title or fencing in the adverse possession 
context, or registration in the trademark context—can alleviate some 
of the demands of productive use.95 This is sensible because in both 
cases, those plus factors increase notice to the public of the claim to 
the property at issue. The faulty title, the fence, and the registration 
all provide objective evidence of the scope of the claim to the public, 
especially to potential competitors. Thus, it is reasonable to provide 
some benefits to the owner of a trademark registration, or the possessor 
who holds color of title, so long as those benefits do not strip the 
trademark system of the productive use requirement entirely.96 
D. Continuous Use and Acquiring Distinctiveness 
In addition to actual, open, and notorious use, both the adverse 
possessor and the trademark owner must engage in continuing 
productive use to secure rights. The adverse possessor must be in 
continuous possession for the statutory period, but “continuous” here 
is a term of art. Continuous adverse possession need not be literally 
continuous, but must be effectively continuous. For example, the 
continuous use requirement can be met through seasonal use, if that is 
reasonable for the location.97 In addition, use by a seller who 
attempts to convey title to a buyer “tacks,” or is counted for the 
benefit of the buyer, in meeting the statutorily required period of 
exclusive possession.98 
In its temporal aspect, acquiring trademark rights in a descriptive 
term closely resembles acquiring title to real property via adverse 
 
94. See 3 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 19:1.75 (“[R]egistration in the U.S. 
does not create the trademark, the owner creates the underlying right 
though [sic] use in the marketplace.”). 
95. See Landes & Posner, supra note 54, at 281 (“The main social benefit of 
a federal registration system is that notice is likely to be more 
widespread, so that inadvertent duplication is less likely; hence, use 
becomes a less important method of preventing duplication.”). 
96. But see Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American 
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 827, 865–66 (2000) (arguing that the actual-use backstop fails 
to keep the intent-to-use registration system from granting rights based 
solely on registration). 
97. See, e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1970) (finding that summer use of a summer home every year amounts 
to continuous use). 
98. See Stump v. Whibco, 715 A.2d 1006, 1011 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998) (noting that tacking is a “well established” principle and applies 
as long as the seller intended to convey the disputed parcel). 
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possession. A descriptive term is not protected upon its first use in 
commerce as a trademark because it does not initially communicate 
information about the source of the goods. Instead, the mark must 
acquire distinctiveness or secondary meaning: consumers must come 
to recognize that the mark signifies a consistent source for the goods 
or services.99 Likewise, the Lanham Act bars the registration of a 
descriptive term until there is sufficient evidence that the term has 
acquired distinctiveness.100 
Pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, examiners with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have the 
option of treating five years of substantially exclusive and continuous 
use of a descriptive mark as prima facie evidence of secondary 
meaning and granting a registration based on such an affidavit.101 
This section 2(f) presumption is reminiscent of the adverse possession 
regime because in both cases, exclusive possession over time 
establishes the property right. Note, however, that while the USPTO 
can treat every descriptive mark as registrable after five years of 
exclusive use, different types of trademarks actually receive different 
treatment. For example, five years’ use is generally enough for a mark 
based on a surname to acquire secondary meaning.102 On the other 
hand, the statement of five years’ use alone is insufficient to establish 
secondary meaning for trade dress that “is not inherently distinctive 
because of its nature.”103 This is consistent with the notice 
justification driving the trademark use requirement. The USPTO 
demonstrates an inclination to see a longer period of use before 
granting a registration to marks that are less inherently capable of 
providing notice to the public. 
Any registration, including one for a descriptive mark that has 
acquired distinctiveness, can also become “incontestable” after five 
consecutive years of continuous use, so long as the mark is still in use, 
and so long as neither the registration nor the common law rights in 
the mark have been challenged.104 The five-year window to acquire an 
incontestable registration resembles the adverse possession regime in 
its own right, with elements of notice (via the registration system) 
and at least an inferred requirement that the mark is used under 
 
99. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) 
(stating as a general rule that marks may be protected if they are 
inherently distinctive or have “acquired distinctiveness through 
secondary meaning”). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) (2006). 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). 
102. TMEP § 1212.05(a) (8th ed. Rev. Oct. 2012). 
103. Id. 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1065.  
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claim of right and exclusively, in addition to the requirement of 
continuous use. In some jurisdictions, the existence of an incontestable 
registration is evidence of at least some level of commercial strength, 
even if the mark is merely descriptive.105  
Courts also frequently evaluate length of use in determining 
whether secondary meaning has been acquired,106 but there is no 
established time for how long a mark must be used in commerce before 
it acquires secondary meaning.107 Courts have repeatedly opined that 
there is no per se minimum amount of time required to establish 
secondary meaning,108 but also no maximum beyond which secondary 
meaning will automatically accrue.109 Even though courts disclaim any 
precise amount of time as necessary or sufficient to acquire commercial 
strength, length of use is a factor always considered, and in some cases, 
dispositive. For example, in Marilyn Miglin Model Makeup, Inc. v. 
Jovan, Inc., the court concluded the paucity in length of use—less than 
four years—was brief enough that yearly sales of over $3 million and an 
advertising budget averaging more than $500,000 per year was 
insufficient to establish secondary meaning.110 
The similarity between the acquisition of property through 
adverse possession and the acquisition of trademark rights in a 
descriptive term is therefore fairly apparent. The tale typically told is 
that the descriptive term may pull itself up by its bootstraps, acquire 
distinctiveness, and become a trademark. On the other hand, 
inherently distinctive marks are treated as strong and protectable 
 
105. Such a presumption runs the danger of reading the productive use 
requirement out of trademark law entirely and should be resisted. See 
infra Part V.A. 
106. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 
(7th Cir. 1976). 
107. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 15:54. 
108. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1130 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that five months was 
insufficient time to acquire secondary meaning). 
109. See, e.g., ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech., LLC, 629 F.3d 
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment ruling that trade 
dress was not protectable despite thirty years of use of color blue on 
medical instruments). The difference in the temporal certainty offered 
the adverse possessor and the temporal uncertainty facing the 
trademark owner is discussed in more detail in Part IV.D. 
110. Miglin Model Makeup, Inc. v. Jovan, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 178, 180–81 
(N.D. Ill. 1984). The court stated that the amounts were $25.5 million 
in sales and $4.5 million in advertising budget for Miglin over the nine 
years between 1976 and 1984. Those amounts come out to more than $3 
million and exactly $500,000 in per year totals. 
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perpetually and without question from first use.111 This does not line 
up with the traditional account of property acquisition through adverse 
possession. That apparent conundrum is addressed in Part II.A. 
II. Productive Use and Trademark Scope 
While Part I described the closest analogies between adverse 
possession and trademark acquisition, this Part considers some 
apparent differences in the regimes and reveals the hidden 
consistencies when those differences are considered through the lens of 
the productive use requirement. Part II.A addresses in detail the 
apparent dissonance between adverse possession and the acquisition of 
rights in inherently distinctive marks. The distance between the 
regimes is lessened when one realizes that the evidence required to 
produce secondary meaning in a descriptive term is the same evidence 
presented to establish the commercial strength, and thus the 
enforceability, of an inherently distinctive mark. Part II.B addresses 
the “hostility” misnomer that has crept into adverse possession 
doctrine. The productive use framework clarifies how claiming rights 
in both regimes focuses on providing the public with notice of the 
respective claims. Part II.C discusses the surface tension between 
adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement and the exclusivity re-
quirement in trademark law and shows how the comparison clarifies 
the nature of the property secured by the trademark owner. 
A. Productive Use and Inherently Distinctive Marks 
As discussed in Part I.D, acquiring rights in a descriptive mark 
resembles adverse possession in its temporal aspect. At first glance, 
the protection for inherently distinctive marks seems, in comparison, 
to barely resemble adverse possession. Unlike a descriptive term, an 
inherently distinctive mark is treated as source signifying on its first 
use in commerce, so long as that first use is followed by “continuous 
commercial utilization.”112 That first use grants priority against other 
users of the same or similar marks for the same or similar services.113  
Inherently distinctive marks are treated as possessing secondary 
meaning at the moment of their first use in commerce because there 
was no other descriptive primary meaning related to the goods or 
 
111. See Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (“Arbitrary or fanciful marks (i.e., Kodak) are called ‘strong’ 
marks, whereas descriptive or suggestive marks are ‘weak.’ ”). But see 2 
McCarthy, supra note 29 at § 11:83 (considering only inherent or 
conceptual strength is “incomplete”). 
112. Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(“[E]ven a single use in trade may sustain trademark rights if followed 
by continuous commercial utilization.”). 
113. Id. 
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services at issue. A fanciful or coined mark, like XEROX for 
photocopying machines, is invented whole cloth and has no meaning 
prior to its use as a trademark. An arbitrary mark, like APPLE for 
computers, creates new meaning for a term with which we are 
familiar. While a suggestive mark, like GLEEM for toothpaste, is 
more closely related to the underlying goods or services than other 
inherently distinctive marks, it still requires a conceptual leap to get 
from the suggestive term to the product’s features. All of these marks 
transform language and create new meaning in their inception and 
use, and are thus inherently communicative. There is also no 
requirement to show any particular duration of use in commerce 
before registering an inherently distinctive mark, so long as the mark 
has been used in commerce.114 Thus, for inherently distinctive marks, 
it appears that protection is automatic, and adverse possession might 
be a poor analogy.  
As this Subpart highlights, however, the use in commerce necessary 
to acquire secondary meaning in a descriptive term is effectively the 
same use necessary to establish the commercial strength of an 
inherently distinctive mark. Without sufficient commercial strength, 
developed over time, the right to exclusive use of the inherently 
distinctive mark is largely illusory. In both cases, productive use over 
time is the signal that informs the public about how much value the 
mark owner places in the mark. That productive use over time also 
reduces search costs for consumers by identifying a consistent source for 
mark-bearing goods and services. 
Barton Beebe’s comprehensive study of likelihood of confusion 
cases in the federal district courts over a five-year period calls into 
question the traditional story about automatic protection of 
inherently strong marks.115 Beebe’s study shows when the assessment 
of the mark’s inherent strength is at odds with the mark’s acquired 
strength, the finding of acquired strength trumps inherent strength.116 
 
114. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2006) (stating that a trademark owner 
only need file and pay a fee to the Patent and Trademark Office to 
register a trademark used in commerce), and § 1052(f) (stating that 
nothing shall prevent an owner from registering a distinctive trademark 
used in commerce, unless expressly excluded in other subsections of the 
statute), with § 1052(f) (stating that proof of five years of substantially 
exclusive and continuous use may be accepted as prima facie evidence 
that a descriptive term has acquired distinctiveness). 
115. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581 (2006) [hereinafter, 
Beebe, Multifactor Tests]. 
116. Id. at 1636. Beebe identified 27 cases where the owner of an inherently 
strong mark had not established commercial strength. In 24 of those 
cases (89%), the mark owner failed to establish that the allegedly 
infringing use would likely confuse consumers. Id. A follow up study 
confirmed this finding over fifteen years of cases from the Second Circuit 
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In other words, it is the use of the mark in commerce and the notice 
function served by that use, rather than its inherent conceptual 
distinctiveness, that matters most. 
A descriptive term must acquire significance in the marketplace as 
a designation for goods and services, becoming protectable and 
registrable through use in commerce. When trying to determine 
whether a descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning (or an 
inherently distinctive mark has amassed commercial strength), courts 
look to two overarching questions. First, do consumers see the mark 
as source signifying, measured through consumer surveys and evidence 
of actual consumer confusion?117 Judges tend to distrust the validity 
of survey evidence,118 and evidence of actual consumer confusion can 
be hard to come by.119 So courts turn to a second question: Has the 
mark owner done enough to establish the mark in the minds of 
consumers through advertising, sales volume, and length of use? 
Courts tend to give great weight to the efforts made by the mark 
owner to move the mark through commerce, including money spent 
on advertising, volume of product moved and sales of goods or 
services. Time in the market also provides prima facie evidence that a 
descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning (which the USPTO 
can choose to recognize in the registration context).120 In the ex post 
genericness context, efforts to educate consumers, lexicographers, and 
other language shapers regarding proper use of its marks are also 
important.121 These factors all serve as proxy evidence that the 
 
and its district courts. Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A 
Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, Stan. Tech. L. Rev., ¶¶ 44–45 (2010), 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/blum-consistency-of-confusion.pdf. 
117. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (stating that secondary meaning is established “if the public 
is aware that the product comes from a single, though anonymous, 
source”).  
118. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club, 34 F.3d 
410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that the “battle of 
experts” in trademark disputes “is frequently unedifying” in part 
because “[m]any experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a 
modest) fee to bend their science in the direction from which their fee is 
coming”); 6 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 32:196 (suggesting that some 
judicial skepticism may stem from the behavior of “parties and their 
attorneys who, in a desperate search for some kind of evidence, offer, 
with a straight face, a haphazard, self-serving ‘survey’ ”). 
119. See Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D. Conn. 1991) 
(“[I]t is unnecessary for plaintiff to show evidence of actual confusion 
[because] such evidence is exceedingly rare.”). 
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). 
121. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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consuming public has taken notice of and imbued the mark with 
source significance.  
These are effectively the same factors that courts consider when 
trying to determine whether a mark (whether its source significance is 
inherent or acquired) has developed the commercial strength that 
would suggest use by competitors to sell similar goods under similar 
marks should lead to a finding that confusion was likely.122 For 
example, in the Second Circuit, courts consider consumer testimony; 
consumer surveys; the exclusivity, length, and manner of the mark 
owner’s use; the amount and manner of advertising; the amount of 
sales and number of consumers; the mark’s established place in the 
market measured through unsolicited media coverage; and proof of 
intentional copying.123 Thus, the strength of a mark—the property 
right secured—is a matter both of inherent strength (or lack thereof) 
and commercial strength, or developed strength in the marketplace. 
As Beebe’s study reports, a conclusion by the court that the mark is 
commercially weak, even if inherently strong, appears virtually fatal 
to a claim of trademark infringement.124 
Beebe concludes from this evidence that district courts recognize 
that “acquired or ‘actual strength’ in the marketplace logically 
incorporates the effects of the mark’s inherent strength.”125 It may be 
equally likely that courts recognize that successful use in commerce, 
rather than inherent strength, provides the strongest indicator of 
trademark ownership. While many of the likelihood-of-confusion 
factors key into the conflict between the parties (similarity of marks 
and goods, proximity of services, likelihood that the plaintiff will 
bridge the gap) and the perception of consumers (evidence of actual 
confusion), strength of the mark is really about the extent to which 
the trademark owner has claimed the right to use the trademark, 
shown by the breadth and length of her use of the mark in commerce. 
It is probably correct to say that marks starting from a position 
of inherent strength are more readily able to acquire strength in the 
market, perhaps because consumers more easily recognize inherently 
 
122. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11:82 (“[D]etermination of whether 
there is infringement requires an evaluation of the strength of [a] 
trademark.”). 
123. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041 
(2d Cir. 1992); see also Mark P. McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory 
through the Lens of Distinctiveness, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 843, 846–47 
(2008) (“[T]rademark strength . . . is one of the factors that determines 
the scope of a party’s rights.”). 
124. See Beebe, Multifactor Tests, supra note 115, at 1636 (showing that 
plaintiff prevailed only 4 times in 74 cases (5%) where the court found 
the mark commercially weak). 
125. Id. 
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distinctive marks as source signifying.126 But the district court 
decisions analyzed in Beebe’s study lean more heavily on the paucity 
of commercial strength than the presence of inherent strength when 
determining whether the mark in question is strong and whether there 
is a likelihood of confusion. For example, in We Media Inc. v. General 
Electric Co., plaintiff’s marks WE and WEMEDIA for magazines and 
newsletters promoting the disabled community were found to be 
suggestive.127 The court presumed the suggestive marks were strong, 
but that presumptive strength was “reduced to reflect third-party 
usage and [plaintiff’s] own lack of usage.”128 
Here, the subtle difference between trademark acquisition and 
adverse possession helps us understand this account. In the trademark 
context, there remains both an affirmative duty to provide affidavits 
of continuing use and the risk that failure to use the mark in 
commerce will abandon the mark to the public domain.129 We might 
therefore analogize inherent strength to plus factors like possession 
under color of title and fencing in the adverse possession context.130 
The communicative nature of the inherently distinctive mark suggests 
that consumers will quickly, if not automatically, recognize the mark 
as source signifying, but the scope of the protection granted depends 
more on the mark’s commercial strength developed over time. 
B. Claims of Right and the Hostility Misnomer 
Scholars analyzing adverse possession have traditionally focused 
on the subjective hostility or adversity of the occupier.131 The 
comparison to trademark law helps clarify that such hostility is a 
misnomer. Courts should instead focus on the objective assertion of 
ownership via notifying productive use. It is the use supporting that 
assertion which provides sufficient notice to the public and other 
potential claimants, regardless of the adverse possessor’s internal 
hostility.  
126. See Bone, supra note 75, at 2130–34 (arguing that there is a high 
probability that an inherently distinctive mark will acquire secondary 
meaning or commercial strength, while there is a lower probability that 
descriptive terms will acquire secondary meaning). 
127. We Media Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
128. Id. at 477; see also M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, L.L.C., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining that an arbitrary or 
fanciful mark can be commercially weak). 
129. See infra Part IV.D. 
130. See supra Part I.C. 
131. See generally Christopher H. Meredith, Note, Imputed Abandonment: A 
Fresh Perspective on Adverse Possession and a Defense of the Objective 
Standard, 29 Miss. C. L. Rev. 257, 261 (2010) (summarizing the 
literature). 
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As discussed in Part I.B, open and notorious occupation of 
property notifies the public and the record owner of the occupier’s 
claim to the property. Open and notorious use of the mark in 
commerce puts the public and potential competitors on notice in the 
same way. In both cases, the occupier is asserting a claim of right—
treating the property as her own, and holding the property without 
the permission of a record owner.132 
In the adverse possession context, permitted use is not trespass and 
cannot lead to an action by the record owner against the occupier for 
ejectment.133 This is so because a contrary rule would allow a permitted 
occupant to sandbag the owner and spring an adverse possession claim 
without providing fair notice to the owner of her intentions. 
While scholars have argued at length about whether a claim of 
right properly requires or rejects knowing or “bad faith” possession,134 
the controversy dissipates when one understands that adverse 
possession keys on productive use that provides notice to the world of 
the claim of the adverse possessor. As the Supreme Court noted as far 
back as 1851, what is crucial is that the possessor “claims [the 
property] for himself,” in other words, “adversely to all the world.”135 
In its abstract and doctrinal sense, the issue of bad faith adverse 
possession has not been resolved. These doctrinal variations and the 
scholarship surrounding them nevertheless all point, perhaps 
unknowingly, toward the same conclusion: either intentional or 
unintentional possession of property belonging to another can be 
considered possession under claim of right to the extent it puts the 
public on notice of the adverse possessor’s claim. The critical element 
is that to secure title in the property, the occupier must act like an 
owner. Whether or not the possession is innocent or intentional, it is 
consistent with the productive use rationale to incentivize possession 
that sends a signal sufficiently strong to prevent ambush of the record 
owner and provide notice to the public. It is the information forcing 
value of the productive use that should be preserved.136 
 
132. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Newport, 416 P.2d 622, 629 (Okla. 1966) 
(“[C]laim to the property must be adverse and hostile to the title of the 
true owner.”). 
133. See, e.g., Murray v. Fuller, 186 P.2d 157, 160 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) 
(holding that use of a driveway without express permission amounted to 
trespassing). 
134. For this Article’s proposed intervention regarding the debate, see infra 
Part V.C. 
135. Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 477 (1851). 
136. Mark Lemley argues that, while the right to exclude is an important 
incentive for copyright and patent protection because it allows the 
copyright or patent holder to recover the average total cost of 
production, this incentive rationale “cannot justify intellectual property 
rights in trademarks.” Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1058. 
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On the surface, the trademark owner does not look like an 
“adverse” or “hostile” possessor because under the hostility misnomer, 
it has become common to think of the adversity as a head-to-head 
battle between an active user and a neglectful owner. The one who 
puts a descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary term to work as a 
trademark is not seen to take that term from any other entity with a 
preexisting right in the term. The disjunction is even more 
pronounced where the mark owner coins a fanciful term that never 
before existed. But at its heart, adverse possession requires only that 
the adverse possessor not be a permitted occupier, to avoid the 
problem of ambush. Once that distinction is understood, we can focus 
on the information-forcing and notice-providing value of the mark 
owner’s productive use. 
The trademark owner makes her claim of right when she polices 
against infringement. Judge Richard Posner articulated a high standard 
for trademark owners who desire to retain their marks: “A serious 
trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince dictionary 
editors, magazine and newspaper editors, journalists and columnists, 
judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to avoid using his 
trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked good or 
service.”137 For the trademark owner, acting like an owner is 
particularly critical in determining the scope of the mark’s protection 
and whether potentially confusing junior use can be enjoined. Settling 
with a competitor who uses a similar or identical mark to sell similar 
goods or services can result in weak protection against third parties 
using the same mark on less similar goods and services. For example, 
when two competitors divided the rights between SUNKIST for fruits 
and SUN KIST for vegetables, respectively, the court denied their joint 
request to stop the use of SUNKIST as a mark for bread.138 
 
While Lemley’s focus on proper incentives is important, the broad 
rejection of the right to exclude as an incentive is too strong. As David 
Friedman has noted, “what we want . . . is not merely an incentive but 
the right incentive.” Id. at 1059 (citing David D. Friedman, Law’s 
Order 135 (2000)). The mark owner should be encouraged to engage in 
activities that provide notice to the public. Thus, focusing on productive 
use is more likely to get us to the right incentive in trademark law 
because it focuses on the notice function of the use without falling into 
the trap of adopting a pure registration system. See also Carrier, supra 
note 56, at 82 (“Providing incentives for development is the primary 
goal of [intellectual property] . . . .”). Without the right to exclude, 
however, mark owners might under produce the information that the 
public would otherwise use to distinguish the mark owner’s goods from 
those of competitors. 
137. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
138. Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 976 (7th 
Cir. 1947). 
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More generally, crowding of a particular word or symbol with 
third-party uses narrows the scope of any given mark created using 
that word or symbol.139 For example, in the recent dispute over 
trademark rights in Betty Boop, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
fractured ownership of the Betty Boop copyrights could make it 
difficult for a mark owner to acquire secondary meaning, because use 
by other companies may lead to widespread confusion and destroy 
secondary meaning in the mark.140 
C. Exclusivity and Trademark Property 
Adverse possession’s exclusivity requirement at first also seems ill-
fitted to describe trademark acquisition, as the trademark owner 
acquires no absolute right in any word or symbol. A closer look 
clarifies that the trademark owner occupies a particular language unit, 
a “trademark lexeme,” and the rights of the trademark owner, like the 
rights of the adverse possessor, are circumscribed by her efforts to 
delineate and police the boundaries of her claim. 
In the adverse possession context, exclusive use means, generally, 
the type of exclusive possession that one expects from a record owner 
of land of that type. Traditionally, the adverse possessor is treated as 
a sole claimant, who through the open, productive occupation of the 
land may wrest it from its current, inattentive owner. The exclusivity 
requirement means that the adverse possessor cannot take title by 
taking advantage of her silence to ambush a record owner or joint 
occupant. And perhaps unsurprisingly, the adverse possessor 
generally may not secure the title while sharing the property with 
the record owner.141 
 
139. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11.85 (“[A] mark that is hemmed in on 
all sides by similar marks on similar goods cannot be very 
‘distinctive.’ ”). 
140. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 967–68 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. 
Supp. 911, 924–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). The court in Fleischer was, 
however, unwilling to grant the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment without more evidence of those negative effects. Id. at 968. 
141. See Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990) (“A general 
statement of the element of exclusivity is that the adverse claimant’s 
possession cannot be shared with the true owner.” (quoting Jacqueline 
P. Hand & James Charles Smith, Neighboring Property 
Owners § 6.06, at 135 (1988))). But see Nevells v. Carter, 119 A. 62 
(Me. 1922) (granting title to adverse possessor who took possession 
under color of title from former record owner and then allowed former 
record owner to continue to reside on the property). There is 
nevertheless some play in the joints. If two adverse possessors occupy 
different portions of the same parcel of land, both can secure title to the 
portion occupied, so long as neither occupies with permission of the 
record owner. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (citing Macias v. Guymon Indus. Found., 595 P.2d 430, 434 
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Driving the exclusivity requirement is an interest in making sure 
that the record owner and potential joint owners are clear about the 
scope of the adverse possessor’s claim,142 as well as allowing the 
adverse possessor to stand out from other potential claimants and 
users of the property.143 Such exclusivity has a notice function, 
conveying information about the possessor’s claim both to the title 
holder and the public. Therein lies the critical similarity between the 
exclusivity requirements in adverse possession and trademark 
acquisition: failing to exclusively occupy property makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for the record owner or the public to detect the 
occupation. 
At first glance, this notion of exclusive possession is inconsistent 
with the homonymous nature of trademark protection.144 Trademark 
law is premised in part on the notion that a given word or symbol can 
have multiple source-signifying meanings—that a given word can 
serve as the foundation for more than one trademark. DELTA can 
thus designate one source for airline services and another source for 
kitchen and bathroom sink faucets.145 Trademark rights in the word 
“Delta” are held by different companies who invest the word with 
homonymous meanings: two different things (goods or services from 
different sources) are designated by the same word. Just as there may 
be multiple meanings of the same word in the public lexicon, there 
may be multiple brands utilizing the same or similar words or symbols 
 
n.8 (Okla. 1979)). In addition, the adverse possessor’s claim is not 
invalidated by the occasional entry of others, even the record owner. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 52 (Colo. 1989) (in banc) 
(“[M]ere casual entry for a limited purpose by the record owner is not 
necessarily sufficient to prove that the use of the property was joint.”). 
In some jurisdictions, where multiple encroachers claim they have 
adversely possessed a parcel, title is granted to the adverse possessor 
with the better color of title. See Meredith, supra note 131, at 261 
142. See Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 830 
(Alaska 1974) (“An owner would have no reason to believe that a 
person was making a claim of ownership inconsistent with his own if 
that person’s possession was not exclusive, but in participation with the 
owner or with the general public.”). 
143. See Weyerhaeuser, 510 F.3d at 1261–62 (rejecting adverse possession 
defense because defendant “did not use [the property in question] to the 
exclusion of the record owner and other permissive users”). 
144. Homonyms are words that look or sound like one another but mean 
different things. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 343 (2d ed. 1989). 
The difference in meaning is attributed to different etymologies, that is, 
the words come from different source terms and their current similarity 
is accidental. Id. 
145. See 4 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 24:11 (“[I]f there is no likelihood of 
confusion . . . the same marks can peacefully co-exist on different goods 
and services.”). 
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for disparate products and services. Thus, the owner of the 
STARBUCKS mark does not acquire an exclusive right to all uses of 
“star,” “bucks,” or even their compression into a single word, but an 
exclusive right use STARBUCKS to identify coffee and those other 
goods and services consumers one can expect to find identified by the 
STARBUCKS brand.146 Trademark rights can thus be thought of as a 
limited property right in a unit of language. 
The difficulty with this homonymous structure, from the mark 
owner’s perspective, is that a mark owner who fails to exclusively 
occupy her trademark may find that third-party encroachment 
interferes with the ability of the mark to convey a singular source for 
goods and services to consumers, or the ability of the mark owner to 
protect the boundaries of the mark. Exclusivity is required of the 
trademark owner even for inherently distinctive marks because failure 
to engage in substantially exclusive use narrows the scope of the mark 
or entirely forestalls enforcement.147 This dynamic is manifested in the 
split-market problem recognized by courts in the SUNKIST 
case.148 Likewise, for a crowded word, it is difficult for the mark owner 
to signal information about the goods on which the mark is used, 
because use by others narrows the potential scope of the mark. As 
crowding occurs, either with the mark owner’s permission or in the 
absence of the mark owner’s best efforts, the mark cannot mean as 
broadly as it might have otherwise meant. In essence, by disclaiming 
conflicts with close neighbors, or failing to police existing conflicts, the 
mark owner disclaims conflicts with distant opponents or new 
entrants. The ultimate effect of failing to police the mark, prevent 
unauthorized third-party use, and maintain exclusivity is that the 
mark will lose its distinctiveness and no longer perform the notice 
function consumers relied on.149 Mark owners who fail to police the 
boundaries of the mark may find that it stops conveying the same 
information to consumers, or at least that the mark will be treated as 
if it no longer conveys that information. 
Exclusivity in the trademark context, like exclusivity of possession 
of real property, need not be absolute. When tasked with deciding 
whether a descriptive mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to 
qualify for registration, the USPTO can accept “proof of substantially 
 
146. I discuss the concept of trademark lexemes, and the homonymous nature 
of trademark law in more detail in another article, The Homonymous 
Structure of Trademark Law (on file with author). 
147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
149. See 3 Louis Altman & Molla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair 
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 20:72 (4th ed. 2012) 
(“It has been repeatedly held that if there are several users of the mark, 
inevitably the mark will lose its distinctiveness.”). 
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exclusive and continuous use” of the mark for five years as prima facie 
evidence of distinctiveness.150 The “substantially exclusive” standard 
allows the USPTO to discount “inconsequential or infringing” use by 
others in determining whether the mark owner has secured rights in 
the mark.151 In the registration context, the existence of some 
infringing activity does not necessarily invalidate a claim of exclusive 
and continuous use. The fact that other use occurs thus matters less 
than whether the trademark owner takes timely action against that 
other use. 
As this Part has argued, inherently distinctive marks are just like 
descriptive marks and property acquired through adverse possession 
in the way that notifying use establishes the scope of the property 
right. The importance of notifying use highlights the relative 
unimportance of hostility as part of the adverse possession regime. 
And exclusivity in trademark law, properly understood, is a right in 
the lexeme established by the mark owner through use. The next Part 
considers the role of the public in the creation and destruction of 
trademark rights. 
III. Trademark Expiration and 
Collective Productive Use 
Part II.C considered how requiring some effort from a claimant to 
exclusively secure the trademark or the adversely possessed property 
serves an important function: engaging in substantially exclusive use 
puts the world on notice of the claim. As detailed below, an exam-
ination of trademark case law also shows how shifts in trademark 
meaning occur through collective, public use of the mark. This Part 
considers how the public collectively engages in productive use, both to 
create trademarks that are nevertheless capable of private occupation 
by mark owners, and to destroy rights in existing marks through ex 
post genericness. Here, public use produces results—unlike the general 
irrelevance of public use in determining when a copyrighted work or 
patented invention falls into the public domain.  
As with other property rights, including other intellectual 
property rights,152 trademark protection has limited range. Uses of a 
trademark such as nominative fair use, parody, and comparative 
advertising are “socially productive uses” that fall outside the reach of 
 
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) (emphasis added). 
151. See, e.g., L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“This makes allowance for use . . . which therefore does not 
necessarily invalidate the applicant’s claim.” (quoting TMEP 
§ 1212.05(b) (8th ed. Rev. Oct. 2012))). 
152. See generally Carrier, supra note 56 (surveying fifty property doctrines 
applied to intellectual property regimes).  
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the trademark owner.153 Some productive use also falls outside the 
grant of copyright protection. Copyright fair use is an affirmative 
defense to a claim of copyright infringement.154 Fair use is a 
sufficiently transformative or productive use of a copyrighted work 
and may be made without paying the copyright owner and without 
asking permission.155 These productive use defenses in trademark and 
copyright law are primarily seen as individual exceptions to the 
intellectual property owner’s rights. 
To date, the Supreme Court has resisted the notion that 
productive use of a copyrighted work can shift the entitlement in the 
work to the public at large, rather than to an individual plaintiff. 
Most recently in Golan v. Holder,156 the Court concluded that 
Congress did not violate either the Progress Clause,157 or the First 
Amendment,158 in restoring copyright protection to works created by 
foreigners that fell out of protection because the owners failed to 
observe previously required formalities.159  
 
153. David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark 
Injunctions After eBay, 99 Trademark Rep. 1037, 1072–73 (2009). 
154. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts 
about whether a given use is fair should not be resolved in favor of the 
self-proclaimed parodist.”); Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 
1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[F]air use . . . is an affirmative defense 
and should be pleaded as such.”). But see Hiram Meléndez-Juarbe, 
DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 181, 218 (2009) 
(positing that fair use is among copyright law’s “traditional usage 
freedoms”); Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. 
L. Rev. 125, 125 (2011) (conceding that fair use has been treated as an 
individual affirmative defense, but urging reconceptualization of fair use 
as a collective user right). 
155. Judge Leval’s foundational article, which posited transformation was the 
crucial element of fair use, utilized “productive” use somewhat 
interchangeably with “transformative” use. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward 
A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1111 (1990) (“I believe 
the answer to the question of [fair use] justification turns primarily on 
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The 
use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”); see also 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478–79, 
497 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (focusing on the importance of 
productivity manifested through the creation of something new as a 
lynchpin of fair use). 
156. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
157. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
158. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
159 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
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Petitioners Lawrence Golan and similarly situated plaintiffs 
engaged in expressive use of some foreign works that had fallen out of 
protection, for which copyright protection would be restored by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement Act (“URAA”).160 The petitioners argued 
that providing copyright protection to works that had fallen into the 
public domain was beyond Congress’s authority under the Progress 
Clause.161 The Supreme Court concluded instead that the public domain 
was not inviolable, and the restoration of protection to select foreign 
works was consistent with Congress’s practice of periodically extending 
copyright protection to previously unprotected categories of works.162  
The petitioners in Golan also argued that they had vested First 
Amendment rights because they had used the unrestored works, then 
in the public domain, to create their own expression.163 The Court saw 
the First Amendment argument as simply an alternate ground to 
articulate an inviolable public domain, and rejected it.164 In the 
Supreme Court’s view, the shift of patented inventions and copyright 
works from private ownership into the public domain occurs 
 
160. Id. at 881–82. The Act also restored copyright protection to foreign 
works that never qualified for protection in the first place because either 
the author’s home country did not have “copyright relations” with the 
United States or the work was a sound recording fixed before 1972. Id. 
at 882. 
161. Id. at 884. 
162. Id. at 887–88. The Court also noted that restored copyright protection 
would still expire, and thus the restoration was only for limited times, 
consistent with the requirement of the Progress Clause. Id. at 884–85. 
163. Id. at 891. 
164. See id. at 891–92. (“Petitioners here attempt to achieve under the 
banner of the First Amendment what they could not win under the 
Copyright Clause . . . .”). The arguments actually differ. An inviolable 
public domain argument, grounded in the Progress Clause, would 
require that expressive works (and inventions) cannot be propertized by 
anyone, even the author, once they reach the public domain. Id. at 891 
(citing Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007)). The 
First Amendment argument is instead grounded in the use of the work 
while in the public domain by the petitioners and those like them, and 
could arguably have been limited to those parties who had used the 
works productively. In fact, the Court did not embrace the petitioners’ 
First Amendment claim in part because it seemed unnecessary, given 
that Congress eased the burden on those who made use of the restored 
works while they were in the public domain. Id. at 891 (“Congress 
adopted measures to ease the transition from a national scheme to an 
international copyright regime: It deferred the date from which 
enforcement runs, and it cushioned the impact of restoration on ‘reliance 
parties’ who exploited foreign works denied protection before [the 
URAA] took effect.”). For a more detailed discussion of the 
constitutionality of the URAA under both the Progress Clause and the 
First Amendment, see Jake Linford, Speech and Progress Institutions 
(on file with author). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor 
739 
uniformly and irrespective of potential personal or public engagement 
with or investment in those works.165 Professor McCarthy has defined 
intellectual property rights as the “exception” to which the 
“[p]ublic domain is the rule.”166 Assuming McCarthy is correct, the 
Court in Golan granted Congress broad power to make exceptions to 
this rule, discounting any potential rights “vested” to the public in 
copyright expression or patented inventions in the public domain.167 
In other words, the public domain of copyrighted works and patented 
inventions is a passive public domain, and works and inventions may 
enter and exit the public domain independent of public use. 
Like the public domain for copyright and patents, the public 
domain from which trademarks are drawn has a passive element. 
Trademarks may not be derived either from an ex ante generic 
term,168 or functional elements of trade dress.169 This is the case even 
if the public invests its energy to imbue an unprotectable word or 
symbol with source significance. For example, the court in Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli concluded that “[t]he public has no more 
right than a manufacturer to withdraw from the language a generic 
term, already applicable to the relevant category of products, and 
accord it trademark significance.”170 But this public lexicon also has 
an active component. In both the creation of marks and their 
dissolution, the public exercises its collective right to occupy lexical 
space and establish meanings, some of which can be reduced to 
individual property, and others that can never be so reduced. 
At first glance, it is odd to suggest the public has a role in 
creating trademarks. In litigation, it is the competitor or junior user 
who typically stands as proxy for the public interest.171 Nevertheless, 
 
165. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892 (“Anyone has free access to the public domain, 
but no one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership 
rights in the once-protected works.”). 
166. 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 1.2. 
167. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892–93. 
168. See infra Part IV.A. 
169. See generally 1 McCarthy, supra note 29, §§ 7:63–7:66 (discussing the 
reasons why functional features cannot be protected as trade dress or 
trademarks). 
170. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 812 (2d Cir. 1999). 
171. Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2311, 2330 
(2009) (“The underlying rationale of trademark protection is based upon 
a decentralized and privatized consumer protection scheme, where 
enforcement is provided by competitors, who act as proxies for the 
consumers.”). But see Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as 
Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60, 63 (2008) (arguing that 
while the traditional trademark litigation narrative accounts for 
consumer interest by treating the plaintiff as proxy for consumers, who 
would seek to prevent confusing uses, courts should also take into 
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courts have found that consumer use can create trademark rights, as 
was the case when consumers started using “Coke” as a nickname for 
Coca-Cola. Eventually, the Coca-Cola Corporation secured rights in 
the nickname just like its other trademarks.172 Consumers also 
contribute to the protection of trademarks. Indeed, as Jessica Litman 
has astutely observed, trademark owners build the source significance 
in their marks “with their customers’ money and active 
collaboration.”173 
A trademark can also be extinguished through public use, which I 
term ex post genericness. In the typical case, the public uses the mark 
to designate the genus of goods, rather than the mark owner’s source-
specific goods. This effectively adds a generic meaning to the word or 
symbol underlying the trademark. When the trademark comes 
primarily to represent a genus of goods or services, rather than goods 
or services from a particular source, the mark becomes generic, and 
the former mark owner loses her rights in the mark. In effect, the 
public use swamps, or out-produces, the source significance created by 
the mark owner. 174 Thus, when 88 percent of retailers indicated they 
knew of no word to describe transparent cellulose film other than 
cellophane—DuPont’s purported trademark—the Second Circuit held 
the term to be generic.175 
The adverse possession analogy helps clarify that the public can 
acquire or exercise something like a property right in the trademark 
lexeme. There are both passive property rights in language protected 
by Congress and the courts as part of the linguistic commons—that 
is, ex ante generic terms and functional symbols—and active property 
rights that the public exercises with regards to the use of trademarks 
 
account nonconfused consumers who might have “a significant interest 
in the continuation of a defendant’s actions”). 
172. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1942) 
(holding that a beverage seller’s use of the term “Koke-Up” was 
substantially similar to the common abbreviation for Coca-Cola, and 
that such an abbreviation is just as protected as the original 
trademark). 
173. See Litman, supra note 83, at 1730 (“Producers have invested in their 
trade symbols . . . [b]ut so have we. The argument that trade symbols 
acquire intrinsic value . . . derives from consumers’ investing those 
symbols with value for which they are willing to pay real money.”). 
174. See generally 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 12:6 (“The standard most 
often applied to determine whether a term is generic is not whether it 
has some significance to the public as the name of an article, but 
whether that is its principal significance.”). Sometimes the mark owner’s 
own missteps hasten the process. For example, DuPont’s advertising 
used the term cellophane to describe the product, rather than the brand. 
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (1936). 
175. DuPont, 85 F.2d at 80.  
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that can lead to ex post genericness. In both cases, as Judge Posner 
stated, “[a] trademark owner is not allowed to withdraw from the 
public domain a name that the public is using to denote someone 
else’s good or service, leaving that someone and his customers 
speechless.”176 Sometimes, the court concludes that a term is in public 
use and cannot become a trademark in the first instance, and other 
times, the court concludes a term that was once a trademark is now a 
generic designation. 
Drawing a direct analogy between the collective, public use of 
trademarks and adverse possession is nevertheless problematic.177 
First, treating generic use of the mark as use under a claim of right 
seems particularly discordant. Lexicographers, a frequent target of 
cease and desist letters from trademark owners, ostensibly catalog use 
as they find it, and have neither the desire nor the intent to claim 
 
176. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (emphasis added). 
177. There is a similar problem in drawing an analogy between the 
potentially confusing use of junior user and the productive use of the 
adverse possessor. Courts and scholars have, in passing, compared the 
trademark owner fighting off confusing uses to a record owner fighting 
off adverse possessors. See supra note 6. The junior user can bring a 
successful laches defense that can prevent a senior user that “sleeps on 
his rights” from securing damages for past infringement. See, e.g., 
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 322 
(6th Cir. 2001) (granting injunctive relief in trademark infringement suit 
but denying pre-filing damages on laches grounds). Extreme delay can 
even result in the senior user being denied injunctive relief as a remedy. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 
1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1982) (barring injunctive relief because twenty-
eight-year delay amounted to gross laches). But the junior user who 
successfully invokes a laches defense does not strip the mark owner of 
any rights in the mark per se, unlike the successful adverse possessor, 
who takes title from the record owner. More often, the successful junior 
user avoids liability by arguing that his use is not confusing, that is, the 
meaning he generates through his trademark use is sufficiently distinct 
from the meaning generated by the senior user that the junior user has 
not created meaning that would confuse consumers, and thus has not 
transgressed the senior user’s trademark right. A court may conclude 
that the marks are not confusing because the words or symbols used as 
the basis for the respective marks are not sufficiently similar or have 
different meanings because the parties’ goods or services are sufficiently 
distinct. See Beebe, supra note 115, at 1623–26, 1631–33 (explaining the 
similarity and proximity factors of the multifactor test). Furthermore, 
marks may not be confusing because the word or symbol used as a mark 
by the senior user is already subject to crowding, and the junior user is 
merely the latest entrant. “In such a crowd, customers will not likely be 
confused between any two of the crowd and may have learned to carefully 
pick out one from the other.” 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 11:85. 
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trademark rights.178 Indeed, trademark rights are arguably irrelevant 
to public, generic use of a trademark. 
Second, the analogy between adverse possession and public use 
that results in ex post genericness also appears to break down when 
we consider exclusivity. Generic use opens up a former trademark 
lexeme to use by every competitor. Every manufacturer of transparent 
cellulose film can use cellophane as a generic descriptor of their 
product. The public is arguably disinterested in engaging in 
substantially exclusive use of any sort. 
Use that results in ex post genericness is, however, use that strips 
from the trademark owner the rights to use the trademark exclusively 
as a designation of source and to exclude others from using it in a 
manner consistent with that source significance. We might think of 
this as a collective exclusivity, preventing only the conversion of the 
term to trademark property. This is consistent with rights historically 
recognized in commons: members of a community could collectively 
exclude outsiders, or collectively decide which uses would be allowed 
and which uses would be prevented.179 
This active public domain is particularly important because 
trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, do not necessarily expire, 
so long as they are in use. Productive use in the trademark context, 
like productive use in the adverse possession context, is relative, and 
the stronger, more productive use should win out, even if that 
stronger use is sometimes collective use. 
IV. Productive Use and Trademark Uncertainty 
Parts I and II described how both trademark acquisition and 
adverse possession regimes are focused on requiring the property 
acquirer to engage in exclusive, notifying use over time in order to 
secure the desired property right. Part III fleshed out the important 
role of the public in actively shaping the trademark lexicon and the 
contours of the trademark public domain, an opportunity effectively 
denied the public in the copyright and patent contexts. 
This Part addresses some critical differences in the regimes and 
what the differences teach about how productive use properly diverges 
in the two regimes. Part IV.A explains the difference between ex ante 
 
178. See Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing: 
Genericide or Language Right?, in Perspectives on Plagiarism and 
Intellectual Property in a Postmodern World 253, 258 (Lisa 
Buranen & Alice M. Roy, eds., 1999) (“[D]ictionaries are key in 
determining whether a trademark is being used only as a trademark or 
whether . . . it has begun to acquire new forms or uses.”). 
179. See Fagundes, supra note 5, at 685 n.146 (differentiating the historical 
use of “commons” from “information commons,” the latter referring to 
the public domain). 
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and ex post genericness and how the phenomena interact with the 
general bar on adverse possession of state property held in trust for 
the public. Part IV.B details the difference in inherent notice between 
physical and intangible property. Part IV.C discusses how the adverse 
possessor’s title in fee simple differs from the warehousing ban in 
trademark law and highlights the importance of the warehousing ban 
by comparing the trademark regime to the domain name registration 
system. More specifically, the productive use requirement in trade-
mark law is perpetual, not one that ends once the property right is 
acquired. As Part IV.D explains, these differences evidence how the 
adverse possession regime is more “crystalline” than the “muddier” 
trademark regime, in the sense those terms were first used by Carol 
Rose to describe differences in predictability between property 
regimes.180 The uncertainty in the trademark regime, however, is an 
important feature of the system, because perpetual productive use 
should be a required cost to secure perpetual trademark protection. 
A. Adverse Possession and Public Property 
It is commonly understood that property held by the state in 
common for the public generally cannot be adversely possessed.181 For 
example, tidelands near the Mississippi Gulf Coast were held in public 
trust by the state, and therefore could not be reduced to private 
ownership via adverse possession, regardless of the relative value of 
the ostensible adverse possession.182 
In the trademark context, Maya Alexandri has argued that 
descriptive terms are in the public domain—language held by the 
government “in trust for the populace.”183 Recognizing this general  
180. See generally Rose, Crystals, supra note 15. 
181. Compare Cinque Bambini P’ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 521 (Miss. 
1986) (en banc) (“The State’s title may not be lost via adverse 
possession, limitations or laches.”), with Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 244 (1985) (noting that the 
Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 allowed non-Indian possessors of Pueblo grant 
lands to extinguish a Pueblo’s title, if the non-Indian had continuously, 
openly, and notoriously adversely possessed the land and paid taxes). 
But see Burgess v. Gilman, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1061–62 (D. Nev. 
2007) (concluding that service marks seized by the government from the 
Mustang Ranch brothel were not abandoned by temporary misuse while 
in government hands, in part because of the general rule that 
government property cannot be adversely possessed). See also generally, 
R.P. Davis, Acquisition by Adverse Possession or Use of Public 
Property Held by Municipal Corporation or Other Governmental Unit 
Otherwise than for Streets, Alleys, Parks, or Common, 55 A.L.R.2d 554 
(1957). 
182. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 510–11. 
183. Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and 
Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 303, 320 (2000). 
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rule would prevent any attempt by a hopeful mark owner to quiet 
title in a descriptive mark. Technically, the same rationale could be 
applied to any mark. Most word marks appropriate words currently in 
use with pre-existent meanings.184 Even fanciful trademarks are 
derived from common language elements. Thus, an absolute bar on 
the adverse possession of public property could arguably apply to the 
acquisition of any trademark, because the morphemes and phonemes 
comprising every word mark are in the public domain.185 
Note, however, that the general rule against adversely possessing 
public property does not apply universally, and is in fact shot through 
with exceptions.186 In some jurisdictions adverse possession can occur 
when the property at issue is not used for public purposes but held by 
the state for private or community-specific purposes.187 Several states 
also boast statutes that expressly allow adverse possession of state or 
municipal property.188 
Trademarks, while drawn from the public domain, have been 
designated as subject to private ownership. The Lanham Act protects 
both registered and unregistered trademarks.189 Most state legislatures 
 
184. See supra notes 29–30, 111, 114, 135–137 and accompanying text. 
185. A morpheme is a fragment of a written word. See, e.g., Richard R. 
Klink, Creating Meaningful Brands: The Relationship Between Brand 
Name and Brand Mark, 14 Marketing Letters 143, 144 (2003) 
(describing how marketers embed words within brand names). A 
phoneme is a sound, essentially a syllabic building block. Ross D. Petty, 
Naming Names: Trademark Strategy and Beyond: Part One—Selecting 
a Brand Name, 15 J. Brand Mgmt. 190, 194 (2008) (explaining that 
certain sounds have common associations with products and marketers 
seek to use sounds to create a distinct brand name). 
186. See, e.g., Richert v. City of San Diego, 293 P. 673, 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1930) (holding that public land which is not reserved or dedicated 
to public use can be adversely possessed). See also generally Paula R. 
Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have 
It Wrong, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 939, 939 (1996) (explaining how 
“[f]ew states simply and explicitly protect all state land from adverse 
possession”). 
187. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Middlebrooke, 32 N.E. 457, 458 (Ill. 1892) 
(vacant lot owned by the city but not held for public use was not 
exempt from the statute of limitations for real actions). But see, e.g., 
City of Gainesville v. Gilliland, 718 S.W.2d 553, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986) (holding that private land conveyed to the city could not be 
adversely possessed). 
188. See, e.g., State v. Harman, 50 S.E. 828, 829 (W. Va. 1905) (holding that 
wild land not used in government administration was subject to adverse 
possession under the statute of limitations because state owned land was 
subject to the statute of limitations unless specifically exempted). See 
also generally Davis, supra note 181, § 31(a) (listing states that allow 
adverse possession for public lands). 
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2006). 
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have created registration regimes and expressly recognize common law 
rights in trademarks.190 As both the federal and state governments 
have carved out statutory trademark protection, the general objection 
that adverse possession cannot claim public property should not apply 
to most trademarks. 
Congress has, however, arguably held one source material “in 
trust for the populace” that cannot be drawn out of public domain 
through trademark use: the generic term that functions only to 
designate the genus of the good or service offered, at the moment of 
first use. The registration of such an ex ante generic term is not 
allowed, because such a term is effectively held in common for the 
public to enable competitors to bring products to market or offer 
services identified in a way that allows consumers to find competing 
products or service.191 Note that only ex ante generic terms are barred 
from trademark appropriation in this way. Marks that become generic 
ex post, like SINGER once became a generic designation for the 
owner’s formerly patented sewing machines,192 can still be 
rehabilitated through the efforts of the mark owner.193 Thus, while 
real property held in common for the public generally cannot be 
adversely possessed, it is most reasonable to understand that ex ante 
generic terms are the only terms “held in common” in a fashion that 
prevents them from being converted to some level of private 
ownership. 
 
190. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.161 (West 2010) (Florida registration 
regime does not preempt common law protection); § 495.031 
(establishing state trademark registration regime); see also Allan J. 
Sternstein et al., Corporate Compliance Series: Designing An Effective 
Intellectual Property Compliance Program, Nov. 2012, § 4:42, available 
at Corp. Compl. Series Intell. Prop. 4:42 (Westlaw) (providing a fifty 
state survey of trademark laws). 
191. The Lanham Act uses “generic” to describe abandonment via ex post 
genericness, but does not explicitly discuss ex ante genericness. 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “abandonment”). Professor McCarthy suggests 
that while 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) refers specifically to the cancellation of a 
mark on genericness grounds, it should also apply to the initial attempt 
to register a generic term. 2 McCarthy, supra note 29, § 12:5 n.6; see 
also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (“Since 
the term [shredded wheat] is generic, the original maker of the product 
acquired no exclusive right to use it.”). 
192. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
193. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) 
(affirming that the mark owner had “by the constant and exclusive use 
of the name ‘Singer’ in designating sewing machines and other articles 
manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously 
and widely—recaptured from the public domain the name ‘Singer’ ”); 
see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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B. Physical v. Intangible Property 
Any comparison of the acquisition of real or personal property 
with the acquisition of intellectual or intangible property must take 
into account the ways that physical property differs from intangible 
property. A trademark is a lexeme that includes both the word or 
symbol recognized and the connection to the goodwill of the producer. 
Trademarks are not physical property. On the other hand, real and 
personal property have an explicit corporeal manifestation. 
Real property is also fixed in physical space in a way that a 
trademark never can be. The permanence of the physical location of 
real property performs a natural notice function that trademarks, or 
even personal property, cannot. Real property bearing on its face 
indicia of active use or ownership provides some notice merely 
through its consistent presence in a fixed location. 
On the other hand, adverse possession of personal property (also 
known as “chattel property”) has been rejected by courts when they 
recognize that open and notorious use of personal property “may not 
be sufficient to put the original owner on actual or constructive notice 
of the identity of the possessor.”194 Like personal property, trademarks 
have a physical manifestation when they are affixed to goods, but 
affixation is no longer the sine qua non of trademark protection. And 
like other regimes protecting nonrivalrous goods,195 it can be difficult 
to detect trademark infringement.196 In light of these differences, 
securing rights in a trademark should require a higher level of notice 
than acquiring real property through adverse possession. The next 
subpart details how the antiwarehousing principle in trademark law 
establishes this higher desired level of notice through the trademark 
regime’s continual use requirement. 
C. Warehousing and the Domain Name System 
The differences between adverse possession and trademark 
acquisition are not limited to differences in corporeal manifestation. 
While both the adverse possessor and the trademark owner must 
 
194. Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils 
of (Mis)reasoning by Analogy, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1355, 1368 (2000) 
(quoting O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980)).  
195. David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 22, 55–56 (2006) (arguing that trademarks are impure 
public goods with nonrivalrous characteristics). 
196. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual 
Property Infringement, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469, 507 n.241 (2011). 
But see Paul Heald, Comment, Money Damages and Corrective 
Advertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 629, 646 
(1988) (arguing that the chance of nondetection of trademark 
infringement is low because “a trademark has a conspicuous public 
presence”). 
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engage in continuous use to acquire their respective rights, the 
trademark owner never secures title in fee simple. Unlike rights in real 
property, or even intellectual property rights like copyright or patent 
protection, trademark rights are property rights dependent upon 
perpetual use of the property held.  
Failure to use a mark in commerce leads to its abandonment, no 
matter the strength of the mark, and even if the mark had previously 
been used for an extended period of time.197 This is true not only for 
actual use of the mark in commerce, which secures common law 
rights, but also for trademark registrations. The owner of a trademark 
registration must file an affidavit of continuing use after the first six 
years of registration,198 and then every ten years,199 to retain the 
registration.200 If the mark is no longer used for any of those goods or 
services, the registration can be cancelled for abandonment.201 But like 
title to real property in fee simple, the trademark owner who 
continuously uses the mark in commerce can control the mark 
perpetually—a key difference between the trademark regime and the 
protection for limited times afforded to copyrights and patents.202 
While real property, like patents and copyrights, generally may be 
“warehoused” or held idle, trademarks may not.203 
Even this difference between the acquisition of real property and 
trademark rights is not as stark as it first appears. Real property may 
be left idle in perpetuity, so long as the record owner meets its 
obligations to monitor the property against adverse possessors. In this 
way, the continual use requirement imposed on the trademark owner 
is somewhat similar to the adverse possession regime generally, 
because both regimes include a mechanism whereby the inactive 
owner can lose property held idle. For the adverse possessor, the title 
 
197. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 284–85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an Indian restaurant’s nonuse of its 
trademark for more than three years was enough to constitute 
abandonment). 
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a)(1) (2006). 
199. Id. § 1058(a)(3). 
200. See 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 4.03 (2011) 
(discussing the process of canceling and retaining a trademark). 
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1119; see also supra note 93. 
202. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An 
(Inter)Nationalist Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 Colum. J.L. & 
Arts 355, 372 (2007). 
203. See, e.g., Harod v. Sage Prods., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1379 (S.D. 
Ga. 2002) (“Plaintiffs . . . failed to make significant use of the 
[registered] mark, and the law does not permit them to waste their 
rights in this mark where Defendant can and has put the mark to 
productive use.”). 
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acquired in fee simple is only as good as her ability to prevent 
subsequent adverse possession. Thus, in any property regime that uses 
adverse possession as an equitable backstop, the title in fee simple is 
subject to transfer if the record owner becomes inattentive. This 
monitoring requirement is the focus of some criticism of the adverse 
possession regime,204 but as a result, the duration of the right in real 
property in an adverse possession regime differs from the trademark 
right in degree, not in kind. 
One can see the importance of the bar on warehousing in 
trademark law when comparing the productive use trademark regime 
with the registration-only regime for acquiring domain names.205 
Domain names are limited resources, much like real property, in that 
only one person can own a given domain name. Domain name 
registrations are also first-come, first-served.206 Domain name 
registrars are not required to ask whether a registrant uses the word 
that makes up the domain name as part of a business, or has other 
preexisting interests in it,207 and early on in the history of domain 
name registrations, neither were registrants. Enterprising domain 
name registrants soon realized they could acquire domain names that 
included a well-known brand or the name of a celebrity. This practice 
conflicted with established trademark and publicity rights, and was 
inconsistent with the concept of notifying productive use. As Anupam 
Chander noted, this first-in-time domain name policy did a poor job 
of guaranteeing that the first mover would be the person who can 
make the most productive use of a domain name.208 
Initially, aggrieved trademark owners sought relief through 
actions for trademark dilution, but that provided relief only to the 
 
204. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal 
Property, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 119, 156 (1989) (arguing that the danger of 
transfer through adverse possession leads owners to engage in inefficient 
monitoring). 
205. A domain name is a unique address on the Internet, like <uspto.gov>. 
206. See Ughetta Manzone, Recent Case, Panavision International, L.P. v. 
Toeppen, 13 Berkley Tech. L.J. 249, 249 (1998) (describing the 
domain name registration regime prior to the passage of the ACPA and 
the adoption of the UDRP); Gillian K. Hadfield, Essay, Privatizing 
Commercial Law: Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. 
L. 257, 272 (2002) (“The UDRP as [then] currently implemented, for 
example, reflects a choice to allow first-come-first-serve registration . . . 
without contacting alternative potential users of the name or resolving 
competing claims among them.”). 
207. A domain name registrar is an entity that manages the reservation of 
Internet domain names. 
208. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 746–
47 (2003). 
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strongest marks.209 The response, both nationally and internationally, 
was to allow trademark owners to inject relative merit of the 
productive use of the mark owner and the registrant into processes for 
resolving disputes over domain names. Congress passed the 
Anticybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA) in 1999 to deal with the 
problem.210 Under the ACPA, trademark owners can seek the transfer 
of domain names from registrants who register, traffic in, or use a 
domain name.211 There are two overarching conditions for the 
transfer. First, the domain name must be identical or confusingly 
similar to a distinctive mark, or identical, confusingly similar to, or 
dilutive of a famous mark.212 Second, the domain name must have 
been registered with “a bad faith intent to profit” from the mark.213 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), tasked with coordinating the global Internet systems for 
the United States and others, worked closely with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to draft a Uniform 
Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).214 The UDRP also 
provides a transfer remedy. Under the UDRP, a complainant can 
obtain the transfer of a domain name if the domain name is identical 
or confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark, if the registrant has 
“no rights or legitimate interests” in the domain name, and if the 
domain name was registered in bad faith.215 
 
209. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Trademark dilution laws protect ‘distinctive’ or 
‘famous’ trademarks . . . .”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
210. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113 tit. III, 
113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) 
(2006)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 
2d 635, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]he ACPA appropriately regulates the 
otherwise ‘first-come, first-serve’ policy of distributing domain names by 
taking into account the legitimate competing interests that might exist in 
a given domain name.”). 
211. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(C), (d)(2). 
212. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).  
213. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). Trademark owners can also seek damages for 
domain names registered after the passage of the ACPA. Id. § 1117(d). 
214. 5 Gilson, supra note 200, § 30.08 (noting that the UDRP was proposed 
in part due to dissatisfaction with the role that Network Solutions, the 
sole registrar for domain names under the .com, .net and .org Top-Level 
Domain Names, played as a trademark dispute tribunal); see also UDRP 
Opinion Guide, Harvard L. Sch., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/ 
opinion (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (organizing and summarizing the 
opinions issued by UDRP panelists). 
215. Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy, ICANN, § 4(a) (Oct. 24, 1999), 
http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy [hereinafter UDRP]. 
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Bad faith in both dispute resolution systems, however, is 
determined in large part by the relative value of use that the domain 
name registrant makes of the domain name and the trademark that 
comprises it, and the value of the trademark owner’s use of the 
mark.216 In both systems, disputes are resolved by considering the bad 
faith of the registrant; the productive use of the registrant, the 
complaining mark owner, and other mark owners; and the relative 
identity rights of registrant and mark owner. 
So called “cybersquatters” are those who secure domain names 
comprised of trademarks to sell them to the mark owner at prices 
higher than the cost of registration. Both systems flag the intent to 
sell the domain name as evidence of problematic “bad faith.”217 
Moreover, commercial gain cuts against the registrant in other 
contexts.218 Intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s site,219 
or otherwise disrupt an established business interest,220 may also 
indicate bad faith. Bad faith is further indicated by providing false 
contact information to the domain name registrar,221 and registering 
multiple distinctive or famous marks.222 There are, however, 
productive uses in which a registrant can engage that push back 
against a finding of bad faith registration. The registrant has a 
stronger case if she has used the mark to sell her own goods or 
services223 or to engage in noncommercial or fair use of a trademark.224 
 
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b). The UDRP 
explicitly acknowledges that its bad faith inquiry measures the 
registrant’s rights or legitimate interests, or lack thereof, with regard to 
the domain name. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(a)(ii). The report from 
the House Committee on the Judiciary noted the same balancing act 
was at the heart of the ACPA. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10 
(1999) (stating that the ACPA bad faith factors “are designed to 
balance the property interests of trademark owners with the legitimate 
interests of Internet users”). 
217. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(i). 
218. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(iv), (c)(iii). 
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V). 
220. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(b)(i)–(iii). 
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII).  
222. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII). The UDRP also considers engaging in a 
pattern of registering domain names to prevent mark owners from 
reflecting the mark in a domain name as evidence of registration and use 
in bad faith. UDRP, supra note 215, § 4 (b)(ii). 
223. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(i). 
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(iii); see 
also H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999) (describing “lawful uses of 
others’ marks” as “including for purposes such as comparative 
advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair use, etc.”); 
supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text. 
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Both systems treat trademark rights as indicative of superior 
rights to use the domain name consisting of that mark. Both systems 
weigh the mark owner’s trademark rights,225 the distinctiveness or 
fame of the mark in question,226 and even “other intellectual property 
rights,”227 in the mark owner’s favor. As noted above, both systems 
disfavor the registrant who registers multiple distinctive or famous 
marks. Both systems implicitly accept pre-existing trademark rights 
as evidence that the owner of those rights will engage in more 
productive use of the domain name than the domain name registrant. 
Chander critiques the presumption, noting that not every mark owner 
will necessarily engage in more productive use.228 But it is not 
unreasonable to think that a trademark owner might be more likely to 
engage in productive use of a domain name incorporating her mark 
than a domain name registrant who has no pre-existing interest, and 
even lacks plans to use the domain name to offer goods and services. 
In addition to trademark rights, the ACPA provides a cause of 
action for those whose personal name is protected as a mark.229 
Another provision of the Act establishes civil liability for registering a 
domain name consisting of the name of another living person (or a 
confusingly similar variation) without consent for the purpose of 
selling the domain name to that person or a third party.230 The UDRP 
limits its protection to trademarks,231 although UDRP panelists have 
recognized that personal names can acquire distinctiveness.232 And 
both systems recognize the legitimacy of domain registrants who have 
a pre-existing identity associated with the domain name registered.233 
 
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(a)(i), (b)(i)–(ii). 
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). 
227. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I); see also UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(ii). 
228. See Chander, supra note 208, at 747 (“[T]he system does a poor job of 
ensuring that domain names end up in the hands of the persons who 
value them most.”). 
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). 
230. Id. § 8131(1)(A); see also Bogoni v. Gomez, 847 F. Supp. 2d 519 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a domain registrant who purchased 
multiple versions of a philanthropist’s real name and tried to sell each 
domain name for $1,000,000 violated the ACPA). 
231. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Who Owns “Hillary.com”? Political Speech 
and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 55, 62 (2008) 
(describing how registration of a politician’s name will not violate the 
UDRP unless the name is “trademarked or trademarkable”). 
232. See, e.g., Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210, 2000 WL 33674395 (WIPO 
Arb. & Mediation Ctr. May 29, 2000) (finding that Julia Roberts had 
acquired a common law trademark in her name and transferring 
<juliaroberts.com> to the actress). 
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II); UDRP, supra note 215, § 4(c)(ii). 
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For example, one registrant, Michael Urvan, who had been known as 
“Sting,” prevailed in a UDRP action against Gordon Sumner, the 
former bassist and lead singer of The Police, even though Sumner was 
arguably the more famous “Sting.”234 
Both the ACPA and the UDRP insert a productive use 
requirement as an equitable limit on the ownership of a domain name, 
much the same way that adverse possession serves as an equitable 
limit on the warehousing of real property.235 The simple economic 
story about the alienation of property presupposes that, so long as 
transaction costs are sufficiently low, it matters not who initially 
holds the property right, because the highest-value user will be able to 
negotiate for the property.236 Inserting a cause of action for trademark 
owners into the domain name registration process suggests a distrust 
of the market in reaching the most efficient result.237 
D. Mud and Crystals in Property Acquisition Regimes 
As discussed above, the property right in a trademark must be 
consistently re-earned through productive use, while real property 
acquired through adverse possession can be held idle for the most part. 
The regimes also differ importantly in their clarity about how long it 
takes to secure those rights. The initial acquisition of a descriptive 
mark must be continuous for long enough to develop secondary 
meaning, prior to competing uses by others. The Patent and 
Trademark Office has the discretion, under section 2(f) of the Lanham 
Act, to treat a descriptive term as though it has acquired secondary 
meaning and grant a registration based on five years of substantially 
exclusive and continuous use of the mark. Outside that soft 
presumption,238 there is little clarity regarding how long it will take the 
mark owner to obtain secondary meaning, commercial strength, or fame 
in the market. In fact, courts continuously disclaim that any given 
amount of time is either sufficient or necessary to develop secondary 
meaning.239 This is different than the adverse possession regime, where 
every state sets a clear, statutorily defined period after which the 
adverse possessor’s use will lead to a transfer of rights. 
In considering the development of property rules over time, Carol 
Rose describes some rules as formal, hard-edged, and occasionally 
 
234. Sumner v. Urvan, No. D2000-0596, 2000 WL 33939204 (WIPO Arb. & 
Mediation Ctr. Jul. 24, 2000). 
235. See supra note 204. 
236. See Chander, supra note 208, at 720 (explaining that as long as 
transaction costs are minimal an “efficient outcome will be reached”). 
237. Id. at 781–91. 
238. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
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merciless.240 These rules are “crystal,” providing certainty to property 
owners about the scope of their rights, which allows them to better 
plan for the future.241 While the adverse possession factors might lead 
one to see the regime as grounding title on meeting a “muddy” or 
imprecise standard,242 the adverse possessor’s ability to rely on a 
precise statutorily required period of possession before title vests 
provides greater certainty than trademark law’s secondary meaning 
inquiry. Providing the adverse possessor with a title grant 
commensurate with the bounds of her fence, or the property borders 
described in her color of title, is another relatively crystalline rule. So 
long as productive use occurs somewhere within the borders of the 
property, the bright line of borders or documentation defines the 
boundaries of the property right. 
Comparing the regimes lays bare the muddiness inherent in the 
trademark system. One of the characteristics of muddy property rules 
is that they grant more discretion to decisionmakers after the fact,243 
and so for many muddy rules, it is difficult to know the scope of an 
entitlement until it is litigated.244 In that way, the likelihood-of-
confusion test is prototypically muddy. 
Some facets of trademark protection are relatively crystalline, but 
the crystallization we see in the trademark system is undercut by 
common law developments in several ways. For example, the 
relatively clear cut distinctiveness categories are muddied when the 
acquisition of commercial strength becomes more dispositive than 
inherent strength in determining whether the mark can be enforced.245 
There are few periods of certainty for the mark owner to rely on in 
securing secondary meaning or commercial strength, which 
compounds the problem.246 With regard to the commercial strength 
factor, this tendency is less troubling when viewed through the 
adverse possession lens because it is consistent use over time, not 
mere initial possession, that communicates to consumers the source 
 
240. See Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 577–78 (“Property law . . . has 
always been heavily laden with hard-edged doctrines that tell everyone 
exactly where they stand.”). 
241. Id. at 595. 
242. Guy Pessach, Reciprocal Share-Alike Exemptions in Copyright Law, 30 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1245, 1285–86 (2008) (characterizing adverse 
possession as a muddy standard). 
243. See Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 591. 
244. Id. at 581. 
245. See Beebe, supra note 115, at 1636 (“For example, courts found marks 
to be inherently weak but commercially strong in twenty-three of the 
opinions sampled.”). 
246. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
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significance of the mark.247 With regard to the absence of a clear 
duration window, the adverse possession parallel helps us recognize 
that trademark protection is a stepped process where extended 
periods of use bring more extensive rights. The temporal uncertainty 
of the length-of-use requirement to secure trademark rights is less 
troubling than it might first appear because it pushes us back toward 
recognizing use in commerce as the foundation of trademark rights. 
The claim to a mark stems not from the duration of use but instead 
from continuation of the use, and that is as it should be. 
Likewise, the tendency of most courts to weaken the presumption 
of strength for incontestable marks where there is an indication that 
the mark is in fact commercially weak muddies the rule to the benefit 
of competition.248 Here, courts seem interested in getting “right 
results” where a bright-line rule might wreak havoc or work an 
injustice. That same instinct may motivate the guidance given 
examining attorneys at the USPTO to consider the type of mark 
before applying the section 2(f) presumption in favor of finding 
secondary meaning and registering a descriptive mark after five years 
of use.249 Not every court, unfortunately, takes a close look at 
incontestable marks. In a handful of jurisdictions, courts presume that 
incontestable marks are inherently strong, based simply on 
registration status.250 Similarly, the presumption that registered 
descriptive marks have acquired secondary meaning somewhat 
undermines the value of uncertainty about the time it takes to acquire 
commercial strength and secondary meaning as a way to keep the 
mark owner on her toes, commercially speaking.251 
Trademark protection is relatively crystalline at registration, but 
trademark litigation, centered as it is around the likelihood-of-
 
247. The law errs in exactly the other direction for assertion of trademark 
protection. It is not the goods defined in the registration that define the 
scope of protection, but the use that defines the scope of the 
registration. Where a mark owner fails to offer the goods or services in 
commerce under that mark, she will lose the registration, at least for 
unused goods and services. See supra text accompanying note 201.  
248. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 
F.3d 922, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the district court 
erroneously relied on incontestability as being dispositive”). 
249. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
250. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 600 
(6th Cir. 1991) (presuming the mark was strong since it had been 
registered and uncontested for five years); see also infra note 282 and 
accompanying text. This is inconsistent with the productive use 
requirement for reasons discussed in Part V.A. 
251. See Packman v. Chi. Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that a registered mark is presumed to have acquired secondary 
meaning). 
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confusion inquiry, muddies up the trademark right considerably. The 
lack of certainty regarding trademark rights may cause some problems 
not only for mark owners, but also for their competitors and the 
public.252 David Fagundes has argued persuasively that more 
crystalline boundaries of copyright protection, which would provide 
greater certainty about the scope of copyright ownership, could also 
sharpen boundaries to help clearly delineate the public domain. For 
example, copyright fair use is a muddy defense.253 Fagundes argues 
that creating clear safe harbors for fair use may aid some fair users by 
helping them identify activities they can clearly engage in without the 
permission of the copyright owner and without the fear of triggering 
copyright liability.254 
It is not true in every case, however, that crystallization will 
benefit the public. For example, the Lanham Act grants constructive 
nationwide first use from the time a registrant files a section 1(b) 
“intent-to-use” (ITU) application. The ITU application thus reserves 
lexical space to the trademark owner prior to actual use in a way that 
we might find out of sync with the productive use requirement.255 In 
WarnerVision Entertainment Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc.,256 
Empire of Carolina held an ITU application to use REAL WHEELS 
as a mark for toy vehicles, but had not yet begun selling toys under 
the REAL WHEELS mark when WarnerVision began selling video 
cassettes packaged with toy cars under the REAL WHEELS mark.257 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Empire of Carolina could not 
be enjoined from using its mark in commerce, obtaining a section 1(a) 
use-based registration, and acquiring priority dating back to the date 
of the section 1(b) ITU application.258 The court concluded that to 
allow another’s subsequent use in commerce to cut off the ability of 
the prior ITU applicant to develop rights in the mark would run 
counter to congressional intent and “encourage unscrupulous 
 
252. See generally David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. 
L. Rev. 139 (2009) (suggesting that clearer rules about the scope of 
copyright protection might better enable public domain uses). 
253. Id. at 151. 
254. See id. at 151–53 (discussing how the muddy rules involving fair use 
favor owners at the expense of users). I discuss a similar proposal for 
crystallizing trademark timelines for the public benefit in Part V.B. 
255. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b), 1057(c) (2006) (describing how a trademark 
may be registered before use); see also supra notes 90–94 and 
accompanying text. 
256. WarnerVision Entm’t Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
257. Id. at 260–61. 
258. See id. at 262 (“To permit such an injunction would eviscerate the ITU 
provisions and defeat their very purpose.”). 
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entrepreneurs to look in the record for new [intent-to-use] applications 
by large companies, rush in to make a few sales under the same 
mark,” and extort a settlement to permit the ITU applicant to 
proceed with its plans for the mark.259 
While registration is notice-providing, granting priority based 
only on bona-fide intent to use the property moves somewhat far 
afield from the productive use principle.260 But this is not much 
different than using color of title or fencing to set the boundaries of 
constructive possession. The ITU application only matures to an 
actual application once the mark owner uses the mark in commerce.261 
So long as the USTPO is diligent in assuring that ITU applications 
either mature to use-based applications or eventually run out of 
extensions, the danger posed by ITU applications is fairly limited. To 
the extent the USPTO has not diligently policed ITU applications, 
that oversight should be corrected. 
In the end, predictability in property regimes, or the lack thereof, 
matters to both property owners and those who allegedly infringe 
property rights. Mark Lemley’s general rejection of analogies between 
real and intellectual properties is driven by a desire to focus attention 
on the alleged rights of the intellectual property owner, and not the 
free riding of the alleged infringer, when considering whether to 
extend the scope of intellectual property protection.262 Turning away 
from the alleged infringer is just as monotonic as turning solely to her. 
Instead, we should weigh the relative value the uses bring to the 
table. That’s what fair use does in copyright law: preserving space for 
those productive uses that we might value more highly than the 
ability of the copyright owner to control the work or extract rents for 
it. Perhaps those courts reviewing asserted trademark claims have 
failed because they’ve missed the significance of the productive use 
requirement. The similarities between adverse possession and 
trademark acquisition, outlined in Parts I and II, ideally remind us of 
the importance of productive use. 
 
259. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 19.08[1][d] (3d ed. 1992)). Congress apparently created the intent-to-
use application in part to respond to the prior muddying of the use rule 
which allowed registration based on token use, that is, without genuine 
use in commerce. Daniel R. Bereskin, Miles J. Alexander & Nadine 
Jacobson, Bona Fide Intent to Use in the United States and Canada, 
100 Trademark Rep. 709, 717 (2010) (reporting that the “bona fide” 
requirement in the intent-to-use standard was designed to eliminate 
“token use”). 
260. See Mossoff, supra note 74, at 423 (“This amendment to trademark law 
represents in principle an illegitimate ‘land grab.’ ”). 
261. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
262. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 2, at 1068 (“The proper focus is on 
the intellectual property owner, not the accused infringer.”). 
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Part IV of this Article tackles the problem from the other side, 
recognizing that the differences in the regimes affirms the importance 
of continual use in a properly functioning trademark regime. Scholars 
like John Duffy argue that the value in comparing real and 
intellectual property comes from the attempt to unify all potential 
property regimes under a single umbrella, much like “the relentless 
push to reduce the number of natural laws so that ‘[m]ore and more 
apparently diverse phenomena are explained by fewer and fewer 
underlying principles.’ ”263 To Duffy, unification “may help guide 
policymakers to wise law” because “each additional unification brings 
new insight.”264 In light of the analysis in Part IV, I am not persuaded 
that unification should be our primary goal, because the exceptions 
can overtake the general rule. 
In the end, the differences in regimes matter nearly as much as 
the similarities. Recognizing the productive use requirement helps 
clarify that our adverse possession and trademark acquisition regimes 
should incentivize communicative, productive use. To the extent that 
either regime falls short of that mark, it should be readjusted. This 
Article makes a few proposals in that spirit in Part V. 
V. Interventions 
From the preceding analysis, this Article proposes three main 
interventions, two for trademark law and one for adverse possession. 
First, while scholars have argued in favor of curtailing the 
incontestability of descriptive marks or denying protection to them 
altogether, the productive use analysis suggests that the process of 
acquiring secondary meaning is valuable both because it incentivizes 
productive use and because the process has a natural notice-providing 
function. It is critical to ensure such protection for descriptive marks 
is consistent with the productive use rationale. Thus, the USPTO 
should take a closer look at affidavits of incontestability, at least for 
descriptive marks, and those courts that presume a mark is strong 
because it is incontestable should reconsider that presumption. 
Second, the Article proposes various tweaks to crystallize the 
abandonment window as well as the time required to acquire 
distinctiveness or develop commercial strength and acknowledges 
potential problems that might result. Finally, the Article recommends 
moving away from the bad faith conundrum in adverse possession 
because the intent of the possessor has little relevance to the 
productivity of her use or the notice it provides. 
 
263. Duffy, supra note 5, at 1090 (quoting John C. Taylor, Hidden Unity 
in Nature’s Laws xi (2001)). 
264. Id. 
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A. Descriptive Marks, Risk, and Reward 
Several scholars have challenged the protectability of descriptive 
terms as marks, both because of their inherent and irrevocable public 
nature, and because some descriptive marks that never acquired 
secondary meaning slip through the USPTO and become 
incontestable. The productive use rationale for trademark acquisition 
makes clear that these concerns are somewhat overstated (the first 
more so than the second), so long as productive use is actually 
required before descriptive marks are protected. The process for 
acquiring protection of, and even incontestability for, a descriptive 
mark is consistent with the notice function of productive use because 
it signals the relative value that the mark owner, competitors, and the 
public place on respective uses of the mark. In addition, the 
commercial-use requirement provides an important check on the 
danger of error on the part of the USPTO in granting incontestability 
to descriptive marks. 
Some scholars have advocated abolishing protection for 
descriptive marks altogether. Secondary meaning is hard to prove, so 
banning protection of descriptive marks would arguably avoid that 
“nightmarish undertaking.”265 Of course, courts ask the same 
questions when analyzing the commercial strength of an initially 
descriptive mark or the commercial strength of an inherently 
distinctive mark.266 Judicial efficiency itself is no ground to deny 
protection to descriptive marks. 
Other scholars criticize descriptive marks because the descriptive 
term propertized is irrevocably public, whether or not that descriptive 
term also comes to carry a secondary, source signifying meaning. 
Descriptive marks don’t have the creative bona fides of even the lowly 
suggestive mark, and as Lisa Ramsey notes, they never entirely shake 
their initial descriptive sense.267 Maya Alexandri recognizes that the 
mark owner must labor to acquire secondary meaning in descriptive 
marks, but discounts that labor, on the ground that it requires no 
labor to initially “capture” a descriptive mark.268 Alexandri fails to 
recognize that prior to the acquisition of secondary meaning, the 
descriptive mark has not been “captured” at all, just like real 
property has not been acquired via adverse possession until 
 
265. Alexandri, supra note 183, at 347. 
266. See supra Part II.A; notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
267. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 
70 Tenn. L. Rev. 1095, 1147 (2003) (“[D]escriptive terms used as 
marks do not immediately signal a brand of a product because they do 
not lose their original or ‘primary’ descriptive meaning when used as a 
mark.”); see also Alexandri, supra note 183, at 348 (discussing the 
benefits of eliminating descriptive trademarks). 
268. Alexandri, supra note 183, at 357. 
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productive use has occurred on the property for the entire duration of 
the statutory period. And while a descriptive mark never entirely 
loses its initial descriptive meaning, this is different from suggestive or 
even arbitrary marks as a matter of degree, not kind. Every mark 
except a fanciful mark has some preexisting meaning.269 Descriptive 
marks are protected only when the source-signifying meaning becomes 
the most prominent meaning, that is, when the public sees the mark 
as signifying goods or services from a unique source. These criticisms 
fail because they incorrectly identify the point of “capture” for the 
descriptive mark. This temptation is understandable, of course, 
because the easiest thing to know about a descriptive mark is when it 
was first used. It is harder to know when the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness until one litigates the case. 
Descriptive marks have also been criticized because of a suspicion 
that the USPTO often fails to deny registration for descriptive terms 
that fail to acquire secondary meaning,270 particularly in the context 
of section 2(f) applications to register a mark and section 15 affidavits 
to establish incontestability. For example, Suman Naresh considers 
the possibility that incontestability might be justified by a societal 
interest in settling claims (one of the rationales identified earlier to 
support adverse possession),271 but concludes that the public cannot 
consent to the acquisition of an incontestable mark through its 
collective inaction because there is no well-placed public actor to 
oppose the march to incontestability.272 
Recent controversies in the news highlight, however, that 
neighbors often raise a hue and cry when they detect adverse 
 
269. See supra notes 29–30, 111, 113–114, 135–137 and accompanying text. 
270. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 211 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the congressional intent 
relating to descriptive trademarks); Naresh, supra note 6, at 982–91 
(discussing in detail incontestability and adverse possession). 
271. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
272. See Naresh, supra note 6, at 988–89 (finding the visibility of the process 
by which the mark becomes incontestable insufficient to support 
property rights, because unilateral activity is not binding unless the 
public consents). This position leads to problematic paralysis. Both 
John Locke and his forgotten foil, Robert Filmer, realized centuries ago 
that express consent was difficult to come by. As Alan Ryan summa-
rized: “Long before we had secured the unanimous agreement of the 
world’s inhabitants to our taking a mouthful of water, we should have 
perished of thirst.” Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory 17 
(1984). Filmer argued that no one could own or use anything if she had 
to acquire explicit consent from the rest of humanity. Id. at 16–17 
(citing Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (London, 1680)). Locke 
responded to the consent conundrum by arguing that individuals 
“acquire a title to what they need by mixing their labor with the things 
they acquire.” Id. at 17 (citing Locke, supra note 57, at 306–07). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor 
760 
possession, and this activity drastically increases the odds that the 
title owner will be on notice of the attempted acquisition.273 In the 
trademark context, the public is actually empowered to do something, 
as discussed in detail in Part III. Public use will pull a mark into ex 
post genericness or prevent descriptive terms from acquiring 
distinctiveness if the public has begun or proceeds to use the mark 
predominantly in its descriptive sense.274 Likewise, a competitor can 
successfully oppose registration of a mark that the competitor needs 
to use descriptively in its business, or for which the putative mark 
owner has not acquired distinctiveness.275 The five years required 
between a successful section 2(f) application and the section 15 
affidavit of incontestability provides competitors an even longer 
window to challenge the problematic mark. The public and potential 
competitors acquiesce every time an adverse possessor acquires title 
without objection and every time the trademark owner acquires 
protection in a descriptive mark unopposed. If ten or more years pass 
by and no one says anything, the silence itself may be telling. 
Here, Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal’s perceptive take on 
risk and reward is helpful. The uncertainty faced by the adverse 
possessor signals how much she values the property.276 Likewise, the 
putative owner of a “descriptive mark” signals how much she values 
the mark by her willingness to take on such an uncertain proposition. 
In order for a descriptive mark to become incontestable, the mark 
owner must get past potential competitors on two different levels. 
First, the mark must acquire distinctiveness, which the USPTO 
presumes can occur in many cases within five years. Then, the 
registration must remain effectively unopposed for an additional five 
years. If the mark owner passes both barriers, she will do so at least 
in part because neither the public nor competitors see enough value in 
other potential meanings to challenge the mark owner’s claimed 
meaning over an extended period of time.277 
 
273. Casey Norton, Stranger Moves into Foreclosed Home, Citing Little-Known 
Texas Law, KHOU (July 15, 2011, 6:43 AM), http://www.khou.com/home/ 
Stranger-moves-into-foreclosed-home-citing-little-knownTexas-law.html. 
274. See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text. 
275. Both competitive need and skepticism about claimed secondary meaning 
may have motivated Continental Airlines to oppose United Airlines’ 
application to register E-TICKET for computerized reservation and 
ticketing of transportation services. Cont’l Airlines Inc. v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1999).  
276. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. Lee Anne Fennell’s goal of 
limiting adverse possession to those cases where there is a clear signal of 
greater value of the property in the hands of the adverse possessor is also 
consistent with this rationale. See Fennel, supra note 49, at 1039–41. 
277. But see Jess Gupta, Comment, Descriptive Trademarks and the 
Assumption of Risk, 45 U.S.F. L. Rev. 811, 812 (2011) (“[A] person or 
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There is some cost to competitors to follow trademark 
registrations, check USPTO publications, and watch for competition 
in the marketplace. The willingness of competitors to engage in such 
work is a signal that tells us how much, if at all, they value the 
putative mark, either as a source signifier for their own goods, or 
merely to describe their products or services. Competitor interest in 
turn is a proxy for whether it is necessary to use the symbol to 
communicate with consumers, or whether there might be multiple 
ways to communicate with consumers. It may also suggest that 
consumers identify the mark as designating a source for the owner’s 
goods and services.278 Thus, the effort it takes to secure rights in the 
descriptive mark over time is itself information forcing in the same 
way that adverse possession is information forcing.279 
In this light, incontestability for descriptive marks seems less 
problematic if a competitor who needs access to the descriptive term 
will encounter the mark early enough to thwart the initial registration 
of a descriptive mark by either challenging the section 2(f) affidavit of 
acquired secondary meaning,280 or challenging the mark prior to 
incontestability. Ten or more years of silence thus operate like an 
adverse possession window that not only settles the mark owner’s 
claim to the rights that come with incontestability, but also sends a 
signal “to all the world” about the value that the mark owner, 
competitors, and the public place on the mark. 
More generally, granting benefits to registrants is consistent with 
the notice function of productive use, but the notice function of 
registration is not strong enough to make registration alone sufficient 
to secure protection in a trademark. There is a danger that, if the 
USPTO rubber-stamps incontestable registrations based solely on the 
section 15 affidavit, incontestability will protect some marks that do 
not fulfill a notice function and where the mark owner has not, in 
fact, successfully transformed the mark into a symbol that 
communicates a consistent source of goods and services to consumer. 
Fortunately, most courts are sensitive to this issue and inquire about 
the commercial strength of incontestable marks before allowing the 
 
business that chooses to affix a descriptive mark to goods or services 
assumes the risk of weaker protection for that mark.”). 
278. See generally Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, 
An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark 
Distinctiveness, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 1033 (2009) (reporting that survey 
participants recognized a descriptive term presented as a trademark on 
product packaging as a source signifier with roughly the same frequency 
as they recognized “inherently distinctive” terms as trademarks, while 
generic terms were typically not perceived as trademarks). 
279. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
280. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006). 
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owner of the incontestable registration to enjoin the activities of 
competitors.281 The commercial strength inquiry thus operates as a 
backstop to ensure a sufficient level of productive use. Those courts 
that persist in treating incontestable registrations as presumptively 
strong, without evidence of secondary meaning or commercial 
strength,282 should reconsider. 
Recognizing the productive use rationale may also require some 
remedial action by the USPTO and Congress. Currently, the policy 
with regards to a section 15 affidavit is neither to examine nor accept 
the affidavit.283 The office merely reviews the affidavit to make sure it 
meets statutory requirements on its face. Those requirements include 
a statement that the mark has been used in commerce, there are no 
final decisions adverse to the owner’s claim of ownership, and there 
are no pending proceedings against the mark.284 The USPTO and its 
examiners should, and can, do more. As discussed above,285 examiners 
are instructed to consider the amount of time it might reasonably 
take for different types of marks to acquire distinctiveness. Those 
types of marks less likely to serve an independent notice function are 
subject to increased scrutiny before the Examiner will grant a 
section 2(f) Application to register a descriptive mark. 
The same scrutiny could be applied to section 15 affidavits. Given 
that inherently distinctive marks more naturally fulfill the notice 
function of productive use, it would be consistent with the productive 
use framework, and reasonable as a matter of judicial efficiency, to 
limit an in-depth inquiry to section 15 affidavits for descriptive 
marks.286 Those marks are less likely to have acquired significant 
 
281. See, e.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 
F.3d 922, 933–35 (4th Cir. 1995) (analyzing case law and rejecting the 
presumption that an incontestable mark has acquired commercial 
strength). 
282. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 
1991) (“Since Wynn’s mark had been registered over five years without 
being contested, it was presumptively strong.”); Dieter v. B & H Indus. 
of Sw. Fla., 880 F.2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Because Dieter’s mark 
is incontestable, then it is presumed to be at least descriptive with 
secondary meaning, and therefore a relatively strong mark.”). 
283. Maintain/Renew a Registration: How to Keep Registration Alive, U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Off., http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/ 
maintain/prfaq.jsp (last modified Aug. 21, 2012, 7:53 AM) (“The USPTO 
neither examines the merits of § 15 Declarations nor ‘accepts’ § 15 
Declarations.”). 
284. Id. 
285. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text. 
286. One could further narrow the inquiry by focusing on only those marks 
registered pursuant to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(f) (2006). 
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levels of commercial strength, and the close review of affidavits to 
register those marks will likely prevent much of the perceived 
problem.287 
B. Crystallizing Trademark Timelines 
One possible reform stemming from the productive use analysis is 
to get serious about crystallizing trademark rights.288 Crystallizing the 
length of time required to acquire secondary meaning or commercial 
strength would provide some certainty for the mark owner, at least as 
to the amount of time she has to bring the mark up to a sufficient 
level of commercial productivity. It could also provide some certainty 
for the public and potential competitors.  
It might be difficult to create a one-size-fits-all secondary meaning 
window, but consider the result if we treated the section 2(f) 
presumption that a descriptive term acquires secondary meaning and 
can be registered after five years of substantially continuous and 
exclusive use as a hard floor for the amount of time required to secure 
secondary meaning in a descriptive mark. The public and competitors 
would know that the owner must use the mark in commerce for a 
minimum of five years before the mark could be effectively enforced 
against arguable infringers. If descriptive marks are troubling because 
they are derived from broad, descriptive terms needed for 
competition, then the hard floor might do a better job preserving 
space for competitors and the public to make productive use of a 
given descriptive term, up through the last day of the five year 
period. Such a regime might disincentivize the adoption of descriptive 
marks closer to the suggestive line, for which the mark owner could 
otherwise establish secondary meaning in less than five years, and 
those may be the wrong descriptive marks to discourage. But to the 
extent that we think the public benefits when competitors utilize 
descriptive terms without the permission of prior users, the harm to 
the trademark owner created by such a floor might be offset by 
broadening the catalogue of marks that effectively remain in the 
public domain for descriptive use. 
There is a danger inherent in crystallization, however. This same 
five-year window could be crystallized in a way that favors mark 
owners. The five-year window could be treated as a safe harbor for 
mark owners who adopt inherently distinctive marks. For the first five 
years, courts would presume the inherently strong mark was also 
commercially strong. Thus, so long as the mark reaches a reasonable 
level of commercial strength within five years, the mark would be 
 
287. See supra note 126. 
288. See discussion supra Part IV.D regarding how crystalline and muddy 
property rules manifest in the adverse possession and trademark 
regimes. 
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presumed strong, and likely to prevail more often in infringement 
suits.289 Finally, one potentially costly result of either crystallization is 
that courts would be required to determine whether a mark was 
descriptive or suggestive—which is notoriously difficult290—because 
the five-year floor would cut in favor of the inherently strong, 
suggestive mark but against the inherently weak, descriptive mark.291  
Consider a second possible crystallization: if more frequent 
abandonment of trademarks for nonuse is in the public interest, we 
might stiffen the abandonment test outlined in section 45 of the 
Lanham Act.292 Currently, the presumption that the mark is 
abandoned after three years of nonuse is easily overcome by evidence 
that the mark owner intends to resume use—a fairly low standard.293 
Instead of treating three years of nonuse as prima facie evidence of 
abandonment, we could treat it as conclusive evidence of 
abandonment. 
Carol Rose posits that courts tend to muddy crystalline rules to 
prevent forfeiture and protect sympathetic parties from the 
consequences of their bargains.294 Therefore, it would not be surprising 
 
289. Cf. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 
409, 464 (2002) (proposing that copyright’s fair use analysis should be 
sensitive to how long the copyrighted work has been around, and 
perhaps protect younger works more robustly than older works). 
290. See, e.g., BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 
185, 198–202 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (musing that “the vague boundary that 
divides suggestive and descriptive terms” has “bedeviled many . . . 
judges”). 
291. See, e.g., Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 
202 (1st Cir. 1972) (concluding that while a laudatory mark was likely 
suggestive, it didn’t matter because forty-five years of advertising was 
sufficient to establish “a close connection between the trademark name 
and its products” (quoting district court below)). 
292. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “abandonment”). 
293. See, e.g., Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc. 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 
2003) (mark owner can rebut the presumption of abandonment by 
“demonstrating the lack of an intent not to resume use,” and did so by 
discussing the production of his branded bowling balls with two other 
companies (quoting Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 
F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 1992))). 
294. Rose, Crystals, supra note 15, at 597–98. There is evidence of this 
tendency in other intellectual property contexts. Cf. Andrew Gilden, 
Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 24–25), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2121938 (arguing that courts refrain from 
finding infringement in order to avoid granting an “unworkable 
remedy”); Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First 
Publication, 58 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 585, 604–10 (2011) (noting 
that courts crafted the concept of limited publication in part to avoid 
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to see courts act in like manner when faced with a floor for the 
acquisition of secondary meaning, the loss of acquired strength, or a 
bright-line abandonment rule.295 Thus, if Congress embraces the 
challenge to create more crystalline timelines in the Lanham Act, it 
may need to clearly bar any “muddying” of those timelines by courts. 
C. Adverse Possession: Productive Use over Bad Faith 
Finally, as discussed briefly in Part II.B, courts and scholars are 
in disagreement about whether an adverse possessor must also show a 
particular intent to possess property either innocently (in “good 
faith”) or intentionally (in “bad faith”).296 Whether or not to consider 
an adverse possessor’s subjective intent has devoured a great deal of 
intellectual oxygen.297 Scholars have questioned whether we should 
treat good faith adverse possessors more preferentially than bad faith 
adverse possessors,298 and whether courts actually favor good faith 
adverse possessors, regardless of what a given statute or judge-made 
test might say about the claim of right.299  
the harsh consequences of finding a copyrighted work had been 
published without proper notice and thus fell into the public domain). 
295. We actually see such resistance to even the soft abandonment rule 
currently in place. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. 
Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Abandonment of 
a trademark, being in the nature of a forfeiture, must be strictly 
proved.”). 
296. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5 at 151–52. 
297. See, e.g., id. § 4.2.5 at 151 (“Of all the elements of adverse possession, 
the adversity requirement has given rise to the most confused and 
varied treatment.”). 
298. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal 
Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 687–88 
(1986) (suggesting a two-tiered adverse possession statute of limitations, 
shorter for good faith possessors and longer for bad faith possessors), 
with Fennell, supra note 49, at 1039–41 (arguing that only those “bad 
faith” adverse possessors who can show they would have paid for the 
property in question, and thus are possessing only to correct an 
apparent market failure, should be allowed to adversely possess the 
property). 
299. Richard Helmholz has argued, based on his historical analysis of adverse 
possession cases, that whether or not courts explicitly acknowledge it, 
they favor the claims of good faith adverse possessors. R.H. Helmholz, 
Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U. L.Q. 331, 331–
32 (1983). But see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and 
Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 Wash U. L.Q. 1, 
2–3 (1986) (“Professor Helmholz’s conclusions differ so greatly from 
generally accepted views as to justify a careful look at the cases on 
which he based his conclusions.” (footnote omitted)). And for a response 
to Professor Cunningham, see Helmholz, supra note 25. I find Professor 
Helmholz’s description persuasive. Nevertheless, the majority rule has 
not changed in the intervening years. 
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Under the majority rule in the United States, intent with regard 
to the record owner is irrelevant.300 So long as the adverse possessor 
treats the property as her own, it is irrelevant whether she knows it is 
not her property or whether she intends to wrest it from the record 
owner via adverse possession. This standard is consistent with the 
notice function account. It is “the visible and adverse possession, with 
an intention to possess,” one early court decision concluded, “that 
constitutes its adverse character, and not the remote views or belief of 
the possessor.”301 
Understanding that adverse possession is justified by the notice 
function of productive use helps clarify that we should favor good 
faith or bad faith possession only to the extent that one type of 
possession provides better notice to the public. Perhaps intent serves 
as a proxy for other issues bothering courts. Good faith or innocent 
adverse possession is often attributed to border-adjusting encroach-
ments between neighbors, but that encroachment looks the same to 
the world and to the record owner whether the adverse possessor is 
aware of the property lines or not. Likewise, occupying property that 
is not coterminous with the adverse possessor’s other parcels can 
quickly put the public and the sufficiently attentive record owner on 
notice, whether or not the adverse possessor knows or cares that there 
is another record holder. 
In other words, we should stop worrying about good faith versus 
bad faith adverse possession—and stop setting different time periods 
 
300. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5, at 155. Other jurisdictions adopt 
different approaches. A handful of jurisdictions have enacted the 
mistaken possession rule, under which only the good faith or mistaken 
adverse possessor may prevail. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. § 37-1-22. Some 
jurisdictions require the possessor to establish her subjective state of 
mind via her objective acts. Singer, supra note 20, § 4.2.5, at 154. 
Other jurisdictions follow an intentional dispossession rule (also known 
as the Maine rule) under which only the adverse possessor with “bad 
faith,” that is, the intent to dispossess, may prevail. See, e.g., Petsch v. 
Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Neb. 1983) (“In Nebraska, intent to 
assert ownership of the property is a requirement of adverse 
possession . . . .”); Preble v. Me. Cent. RR. Co., 27 A. 149, 150 (Me. 
1893). While the intentional dispossession rule has been roundly 
criticized, it has at least one champion in Lee Anne Fennell, who asserts 
it is the only efficient foundation for an adverse possession regime. 
Compare Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1191 (D.C. 1990) (“To limit 
the doctrine of adverse possession to the latter type places a premium 
on intentional wrongdoing, contrary to fundamental justice and policy.” 
(quoting 7 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 1013(2), at 9–
33 (Rev. ed. 1989) now found in 16 Richard R. Powell, Powell on 
Real Property § 91.05[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000))), with 
Fennell, supra note 49, at 1039–41 (explaining how adverse possession 
should be redesigned to require that an individual be aware of the 
trespass). 
301. French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443 (1831). 
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for good faith and bad faith adverse possessors302—because there is 
nothing inherently communicative about the intent of the adverse 
possessor. We might nevertheless value the possessor who occupies 
with color of title and records the title,303 not because she is a “good 
faith” purchaser, but because the purchase, and the record of it, puts 
us on better notice of her claim. 
Conclusion 
This Article uncovers the productive use requirement and the 
notice function underlying both the trademark and adverse possession 
acquisition regimes. In light of the similar policy needs shaping the 
two regimes, both regimes can merit from a move toward more clearly 
requiring notifying, productive use as a prerequisite to the acquisition 
of rights. That insight provided an opening to explore the shifting 
states between crystalline and muddy property rights in the 
trademark system and the malleable boundaries between the property 
rights held by trademark owners and the public in common. These 
discussions inform the core intervention, suggesting that some 
crystallization of trademark rights, particularly the time needed to 
acquire secondary meaning and the time after which a mark might be 
deemed abandoned, might benefit public and competitive uses by 
clarifying when rights in a trademark lexeme might shift back to the 
public. More generally, this project highlights the importance of 
resisting the temptation either to seek a unified field theory of 
property rights governing real, personal, and intellectual property, or 
to entirely reject analogies between property regimes. As we see when 
contrasting trademark acquisition and adverse possession, a close look 
at the critical features of the right regimes can pay unexpected 
dividends. 
 
302. A handful of states favor the innocent adverse possessor by allowing 
them to secure title by possessing for a shorter statutory period, a model 
championed by Richard Epstein. Compare La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 
3473, 3475 (ten-year prescription period for good faith possessor), with 
art. 3486 (thirty-year period for bad faith possessor). Thomas Merrill 
argues instead that the innocent adverse possessor should acquire a 
property right, but the bad faith adverse possessor should acquire only a 
liability right, which would allow her to purchase from the record owner 
at market value. Merrill, supra note 51, at 1145. 
303. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
  
 
   
